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Revitalizing Fourth Amendment 
Protections: A True Totality of the 
Circumstances Test in § 1983 Probable 
Cause Determinations 
Ryan P. Sullivan* 
ABSTRACT: The Article analyzes claims of police misconduct and false 
arrest, specifically addressing the issue of whether a police officer may ignore 
evidence of an affirmative defense, such as self-defense, when determining 
probable cause for an arrest. The inquiry most often arises in § 1983 civil 
claims for false arrest where the officer was aware of evidence a crime had been 
committed, but was also aware of facts indicating the suspect had an 
affirmative defense to the crime observed. In extreme cases, the affirmative 
defense at issue is actually self-defense in response to the officer’s own 
unlawful conduct. As police brutality and false arrest claims rise, so too will 
the prevalence of this issue. 
The Article examines rulings from all jurisdictions having addressed the topic 
and highlights the matter of Thomas v. City of Galveston involving a 
citizen who was arrested when attempting to stop two police officers from 
stealing his generator in the aftermath of a hurricane. In a subsequent civil 
suit for false arrest, the officers defended the claim by asserting they had 
probable cause for the arrest, despite knowing Mr. Thomas was merely 
defending his property from their own mischievous conduct. Finding for Mr. 
Thomas, the court concluded that under certain circumstances, a police 
officer's awareness of the facts supporting an affirmative defense can negate 
probable cause. This view, however, is not universal—several other courts 
have reached the opposite conclusion: that an affirmative defense bears no 
relevance in probable cause analysis. An examination of rulings nationally 
reveals common themes on this issue as courts struggle to reconcile the 
incorporation of an affirmative defense with existing principles governing 
probable cause analysis. 
 
 *  Ryan P. Sullivan, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. My 
deepest gratitude to my colleagues Richard Moberly, Eric Berger, Matt Schafer, Brett Stohs, 
Stephanie Pearlman, and Matt Novak for their thoughtful insight and generous feedback. 
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Consideration of an available affirmative defense when analyzing probable 
cause helps to ensure accountability of police officers who unlawfully arrest a 
citizen they know, or reasonably should know, committed no crime. Scenarios 
such as those in Thomas v. City of Galveston are not as unique as one 
might assume. The Article provides numerous examples from across the 
country of courts grappling with this issue.  
The Article brings some analytical coherence to the complicated legal and 
factual situations that may lead courts to abandon certain traditional rules 
governing probable cause in favor of more leniency for plaintiffs seeking a 
remedy for police misconduct. The Article concludes with a recommendation 
that courts adopt and apply a general rule that facts supporting an 
affirmative defense shall be considered among the totality of facts and 
circumstances available to the arresting officer, and that such exculpatory 
facts shall be evaluated with the same level of scrutiny afforded inculpatory 
facts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In the aftermath of Hurricane Ike, Kerry Thomas purchased a diesel 
generator that would become the sole source of power for his family’s home 
and an invaluable community resource to be shared with his neighbors. Mr. 
Thomas feared the generator he had purchased would be a target for thieves. 
Never did he foresee, however, that the thieves he feared would be those who 
swore an oath to protect him and his property from such acts. When Mr. 
Thomas caught two men, who turned out to be local police officers, in the act 
of stealing his generator, he issued a threat in an attempt to defend his 
property: “identify yourself or you will be fired upon.”1 The officers retaliated, 
beat him unconscious, and then arrested him on false charges with the 
apparent motive of averting prosecution for their own misdeeds.2 
In a subsequent civil suit for false arrest, the officers claimed to have had 
probable cause to arrest Mr. Thomas because they had observed him issue a 
threat. It was undisputed that he had issued a threat; thus, the elements of 
that crime were present, and under most circumstances this alone would be 
sufficient to establish probable cause and defeat a claim for false arrest. But 
what about the officers’ knowledge that Mr. Thomas only issued the threat as 
an attempt to defend his property from their unlawful conduct? Should 
knowledge of these facts affect probable cause for the arrest? 
As the district court in Thomas v. City of Galveston concluded, “under 
certain circumstances, a police officer’s awareness of the facts supporting a[n] 
[affirmative] defense can eliminate probable cause.”3 This view, however, is 
not universal—several other courts have reached the opposite conclusion: 
 
 1. Thomas v. City of Galveston, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 830 (S.D. Tex. 2011). Ruling 
occurred at the pleading stage and the matter did not proceed to trial; as a result, the facts set 
forth in this article are as alleged by Mr. Thomas. The defendant police officers, through 
pleadings and deposition testimony, provided an intra-conflicting account of the incident. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 836 (emphasis added) (quoting Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
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that an affirmative defense bears no relevance in probable cause analysis.4 
While a modest plurality of courts,5 including the Thomas court, have 
concluded an affirmative defense may be relevant, most limit its relevance to 
only those circumstances where the defense is deemed conclusive.6 An 
affirmative defense to a crime, such as self-defense or defense of property, is 
traditionally asserted by a defendant in a criminal proceeding on the issue of 
guilt, but should an available affirmative defense to the crime also be 
considered when determining probable cause to make an arrest? The Article 
concludes that when a law enforcement officer is evaluating whether probable 
cause exists to invoke the power of arrest and detention, he must consider not 
only the presence of the elements of the crime, but also the readily available 
evidence of an affirmative defense that would establish the observed act was 
actually justified or otherwise permitted by law. Probable cause is most 
commonly thought of in the “criminal law” context, as the inquiry is often at 
the heart of certain pre-trial matters in a criminal case, such as a motion to 
suppress evidence or a motion to dismiss the charge. This Article, however, 
centers on the role of probable cause in civil suits for false arrest brought 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. More specifically, the Article examines 
whether—and when—the existence of an affirmative defense affects probable 
cause such that the claimant may overcome immunity hurdles and prove a 
valid constitutional claim for false arrest. 
The issue at the heart of this Article is present not only in situations where 
officers abuse their arresting power to misdirect claims of their own unlawful 
conduct, as in Thomas and other cases involving police misconduct, but also 
where officers unreasonably ignore evidence of a lawful justification for 
committing an otherwise criminal act. This includes, for instance, a citizen 
arrested for assault, notwithstanding available evidence she was acting in self-
defense, or arrested for possession of either a firearm or a controlled 
substance, despite presenting a license or prescription to possess the same. 
Even if these charges are later dropped or the citizen is eventually acquitted 
due to the affirmative defense, the arrest alone may have caused significant, 
irreparable harm. If the citizen cannot afford bail, she may sit in jail for 
months or years waiting for her day in court—all the while, her children are 
placed in foster care, her employment terminated, her vehicle repossessed, 
 
 4. See, e.g., Holman v. City of York, 564 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2009) (“First, justification 
or necessity is an affirmative defense. In making the ‘fundamentally . . . factual analysis . . . at the 
scene,’ such affirmative legal defenses are not a relevant consideration in an officer’s 
determination of probable cause.” (citation omitted) (quoting Holman v. Koltanovich, No. 4:06-
cv-2133, 2007 WL 3125048, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2007))). 
 5. See infra note 95. 
 6. See, e.g., Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 836 (“[I]f the arresting officer knows of facts that 
conclusively establish that an affirmative defense applies, it cannot accurately be said that the 
officer has probable cause . . . .”). See infra Section IV.B for full analysis on the “conclusivity” 
requirement imposed by nearly all courts that have determined an affirmative defense to be 
relevant in probable cause analysis. 
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and her credit destroyed, not to mention the humiliation and damage to her 
reputation. It is unreasonable to allow an officer to ignore or evaluate 
differently evidence of an affirmative defense on a blind presumption that the 
matter will eventually be “worked out” through the justice system, a system 
that is both slow and imperfect, and historically prejudicial to those of color 
and of limited resources. 
Part II of the Article provides an overview of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for 
false arrest, the general principles that guide probable cause analysis, the 
components of the doctrine of qualified immunity, and the traditional role of 
an affirmative defense in resolving criminal culpability. Part III summarizes 
the case of Thomas v. City of Galveston, where the district court found, on the 
pleadings, that probable cause was absent because the arresting officers 
possessed first-hand knowledge the citizen was merely defending his property 
from the officers’ own misconduct. The Thomas opinion embodies a 
comprehensive, multi-jurisdictional review of the law on the issue and arrives 
at the general conclusion that under certain circumstances, facts implicating 
an affirmative defense could negate probable cause. Even if a version of the 
Thomas conclusion prevails, however, courts must still grapple with a number 
of related questions. This Article attempts to answer these questions by using 
Thomas as a touchstone to analyze scenarios, both empirically and 
theoretically, to determine when a plaintiff could overcome an officer’s 
qualified immunity defense and establish a constitutional claim for false 
arrest, where the officer possessed knowledge of the affirmative defense. 
Part IV of the Article discusses why an affirmative defense is rightfully 
made part of probable cause analysis, and Part V explains how such a finding 
can be reconciled with certain interrelated and universally accepted doctrine, 
namely: (1) that an affirmative defense is to be asserted in a criminal 
proceeding as a defense to the crime; (2) that an officer has no duty to 
conduct further investigation once probable cause is established; and (3) that 
an officer’s motives or beliefs are irrelevant in probable cause analysis. These 
three principles are juxtaposed with the prevailing maxim requiring 
consideration of the totality of facts available to the officer. As this Article 
explains, in determining the existence of probable cause for purposes of  
§ 1983 liability, the analysis requires inclusion of all factual information 
available to the officer at the time of the arrest, including the officer’s 
knowledge of exculpatory information which may establish that in fact no 
crime had been committed. 
Part VI discusses the viability and limitations of including an affirmative 
defense in probable cause analysis—particularly, how doing so may not be 
“clearly established” for purposes of imposing liability. Also discussed is the 
effect the rule may have on an officer’s ability to carry out her duties, and the 
impact the rule could have on the frequency and success of § 1983 claims for 
false arrest. Dispersed throughout the Article are examples and hypotheticals 
which offer guidance on when and to what extent an available affirmative 
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defense should play a role in the probable cause determination. The Article 
concludes with a recommendation that courts adopt and apply a general rule 
that facts supporting an affirmative defense shall be considered among the 
totality of facts and circumstances available to the arresting officer, and that 
such exculpatory facts shall be evaluated with the same level of scrutiny 
afforded inculpatory facts (hereinafter, the “True Totality Rule”). In light of 
the recent Supreme Court rulings in District of Columbia v. Wesby7 and Kisela v. 
Hughes8 where egregious constitutional violations went unchecked because 
the relevant law was “unclear,” it is more important than ever for there to be 
a universally accepted and applied standard on this issue (i.e., clearly 
established)9 to prevent innocent citizens from being deprived of their 
liberties without a remedy in the law. 
In the last two decades, the United States has seen an alarming rise in 
reported police misconduct, both in the way of false arrests and excessive 
force, with the latter too often resulting in the wrongful death of an innocent 
citizen. Many scholars attribute this rise to the Supreme Court lowering the 
bar for probable cause to a level where it barely retains meaning and 
expanding the availability of qualified immunity to all but the most egregious 
intentional acts by government officials. Adoption and application of the rule 
proposed by this Article may not resolve or reverse this troubling trend but 
would at the very least signal acknowledgment that the Fourth Amendment 
remains a vital component in protecting citizens from unreasonable and 
unlawful government action, and that arrests and seizures should be made 
only when reasonably justified by the true totality of the facts observed. 
II. OVERVIEW 
Citizens able to overcome unfounded charges exemplified in Thomas may 
seek civil damages by bringing a claim for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The statute provides a cause of action against a government actor for conduct 
in violation of a right protected by the Constitution or federal law—in this 
 
 7. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–92 (2018) (granting qualified 
immunity in line with its conclusion that where the issue remains unsettled among courts and 
jurisdictions, it cannot be said that the law is “clearly established” in such a way that all reasonable 
officers would understand the conduct to be unlawful). 
 8. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018). In one of its most astounding rulings yet, the 
Court granted immunity to an officer who shot a woman in her driveway without cause or 
provocation; the Court found that existing precedent made it unclear to the officer whether it 
was unlawful to shoot an innocent citizen posing no immediate threat. In dissent, Justice 
Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, found that the decision of the majority “is not just wrong 
on the law; it also sends an alarming signal to law enforcement officers and the public. It tells 
officers that they can shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable 
conduct will go unpunished.” Id. at 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 9. As discussed further in Section VI.A, in order for a citizen to overcome a state actor’s 
claim of qualified immunity and proceed to trial on a constitutional claim, the law surrounding 
the constitutional violation must be “clearly established”—a bar that has been set so high in recent 
Supreme Court rulings that qualified immunity has nearly morphed into absolute immunity. 
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instance, the right to be free from an unlawful arrest. A § 1983 claim for false 
arrest may be defended on the merits by establishing probable cause and also 
by asserting qualified immunity from suit. The Sections below set forth a brief 
overview of a § 1983 claim, as well as a summary of the law governing probable 
cause and the qualified immunity defense. The final Section describes the 
concept of an affirmative defense to a crime and lays the foundation for why 
an affirmative defense has a rightful seat at the probable cause table. 
A. SECTION 1983 FALSE ARREST CLAIM 
Under common law, a false arrest or false imprisonment has occurred 
when a person’s liberty is restrained against his or her will and without legal 
justification.10 A federal cause of action for false arrest arises pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, which provides, in part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 
at law . . . . 11 
A claim for false arrest under § 1983 requires a showing that (1) the 
individual effecting the arrest was acting under the color of state law, and  
(2) the arrest deprived the plaintiff of rights and privileges secured by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States.12 In most actions for false arrest, the 
first of these two requirements is easily satisfied by alleging and proving the 
actor was a law enforcement officer acting under the guise of his employment 
in such capacity.13 It is typically the second requirement that generates the 
most contention. To establish the arrest constituted a deprivation of a secured 
right, the plaintiff must show that the arrest was in violation of his or her 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.14 A warrantless arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
absent probable cause.15 However, the burden of proof on this issue is 
 
 10. See generally Annotation, Malice and Want of Probable Cause as Element or Factor of Action for 
False Imprisonment, 137 A.L.R. 504 (1942) (cataloging rulings espousing this notion). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 12. Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Simescu v. 
Emmet Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 942 F.2d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
 13. 14A C.J.S. Civil Rights § 369 (2019); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49–50 (1988) 
(“It is firmly established that a defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law when he 
abuses the position given to him by the State.”). 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 15. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417–24 (1976). 
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somewhat murky.16 Courts are split as to whether the burden is on the arrestee 
to prove the absence of probable cause, or on the government to prove its 
presence.17 The often intertwined standards for proving the defense of 
probable cause (defense from liability) and the defense of qualified immunity 
(defense from suit)18 further complicate the issue. 
B. PROBABLE CAUSE 
The primary determinant of success in a § 1983 action based on false 
arrest is the presence or absence of probable cause.19 The Supreme Court has 
found the probable cause standard “represents a necessary accommodation 
between the individual’s right to liberty and the State’s duty to control 
crime.”20 As the Supreme Court expounded in Brinegar v. United States, “[t]he 
rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the 
best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often 
opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. 
To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ 
whim or caprice.”21 The probable cause determination involves an inquiry 
into whether “the totality of facts and circumstances within a police officer’s 
knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to 
 
 16. For an in-depth analysis on this issue, see Sarah Hughes Newman, Note, Proving Probable 
Cause: Allocating the Burden of Proof in False Arrest Claims Under § 1983, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 347, 354–64 
(2006). Further contributing to the discussion is a piece by Jonathan Levy, Note, A Principled 
Approach to the Standard of Proof for Affirmative Defenses in Criminal Trials, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 281 (2013). 
 17. The question of who bears the burden of establishing the existence or absence of 
probable cause varies jurisdictionally. Compare Sullivan v. City of Pembroke Pines, 161 F. App’x 
906, 908 (11th Cir. 2006) (“To prove a § 1983 claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
the absence of probable cause.” (citing Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1436 (11th Cir. 1998))), 
with Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 751 (2d Cir. 2010) (“When an arrest is not made 
pursuant to a judicial warrant, the defendant in a false arrest case bears the burden of proving 
probable cause as an affirmative defense.” (citing Broughton v. State, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 95 
(1975))). Who bears the burden also depends on whether the claim is brought under state or 
federal law; for discussion on this variable, see Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1436. It is also worth noting 
that if probable cause is found present for any of the charges forming the basis for arrest, the  
§ 1983 claim for false arrest will likely be defeated. See Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 
1995) (“If there was probable cause for any of the charges made . . . then the arrest was supported 
by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails.” (emphasis added) (citing Heck v. 
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 485–87 (1994))). 
 18. See Kenneth Duvall, Burdens of Proof and Qualified Immunity, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 135, 
148–57 (2012). 
 19. See, e.g., Schertz v. Waupaca Cty., 875 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he existence 
of probable cause for arrest is an absolute bar to a Section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest  
. . . .” (citing Mark v. Furay, 769 F.2d 1266, 1269 (7th Cir. 1985))); 4 HOWARD FRIEDMAN & 
CHARLES J. DIMARE, LITIGATING TORT CASES § 50:42 (2018) (“Like the tort of false arrest, the 
basis of a § 1983 claim for false arrest is the lack of probable cause.”). 
 20. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975). 
 21. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
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conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.”22 An 
objective inquiry excludes the officer’s actual beliefs and focuses only on what 
the facts and circumstances available to a particular officer would lead a 
prudent man to believe.23 The traditional objective inquiry also ignores the 
subjective motives of the arresting officer, but, notably, it does not remove 
from the analysis the officer’s personal knowledge of related facts present at 
the time of the arrest.24 Both inculpatory facts (those tending to establish 
guilt) and exculpatory facts (those tending to clear from guilt) must be 
considered.25 Though “[t]he test for probable cause is not reducible to [a] 
‘precise definition or quantification,’” like “beyond a reasonable doubt or by 
a preponderance of the evidence,” the standard is clearly higher than a 
reasonable suspicion, but lower than what is required to secure a conviction.26 
The standard does not require high probability,27 but, as one commentator 
 
 22. United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) (citing United 
States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1995)); accord NOAH J. GORDON, 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest  
§ 33 (2019); see also United States v. Moncivais, 401 F.3d 751, 756 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that 
“determination of probable cause involves evaluating the historical facts leading up to the arrest, 
and whether those facts, viewed by an ‘objectively reasonable police officer,’ satisfy the legal standard 
of probable cause” (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996))). 
 23. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role 
in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). But see Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 
178 n.2 (1992) (distinguishing the common law defense of probable cause and the modern 
qualified immunity inquiry, the court opined, “[a]t common law, a plaintiff can show the lack of 
probable cause either by showing that the actual facts did not amount to probable cause (an 
objective inquiry) or by showing that the defendant lacked a sincere belief that probable cause 
existed (a subjective inquiry). . . . But relying on the subjective belief, rather than on an objective 
lack of probable cause, is clearly exceptional.” (citation omitted)). 
 24. See infra Section V.C. 
 25. Accord Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 699 (3d Cir. 2017); Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 
F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2013); Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 2008); 
see, e.g., Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 429 (6th Cir. 2015) (“A probable cause determination 
is based on the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ and must take account of ‘both the inculpatory and 
exculpatory evidence.’” (quoting Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318 (6th Cir. 2000))); 
Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999) (“An officer contemplating an arrest is not 
free to disregard plainly exculpatory evidence, even if substantial inculpatory evidence (standing 
by itself) suggests that probable cause exists.” (citing Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th 
Cir. 1988))); see also Michael Avery, Paying for Silence: The Liability of Police Officers Under Section 
1983 for Suppressing Exculpatory Evidence, 13 TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 9 (2003) 
(comparing rulings on this issue and finding that while most courts conclude an officer has no 
duty to investigate all exculpatory leads, “they cannot turn a blind eye toward potentially 
exculpatory evidence known to them”). While the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on this 
point, writing in dissent in United States v. Watson, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, 
opined that both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence are to be considered in evaluating the 
validity of a warrant, and in that matter concluded the exculpatory evidence present was in fact 
sufficient to invalidate the warrant. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 452 n.18 (1976) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 26. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013) (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 
371 (2003)); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). 
 27. See, e.g., United States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 555–56 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The 
probable cause standard does not require the officers’ conclusion to be ironclad, or even highly 
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noted, at a minimum the arresting officer should be convinced that it is at 
least more likely than not the suspect is or was engaged in criminal activity.28 
All seem to agree the standard is a “fluid concept—turning on the assessment 
of probabilities in particular factual contexts . . . .”29 
Probable cause is evaluated through the eyes and ears of the arresting 
officer, rather than the view point of a bystanding officer who may be unaware 
of exculpatory evidence available to the arresting officer.30 In Thomas for 
example, a third officer arriving on the scene at the point of Mr. Thomas’ 
defensive threats would likely have had probable cause to arrest Mr. Thomas, 
where such officer presumably lacked knowledge of the other officers’ earlier 
conduct that gave rise to the affirmative defense. 
In many instances, probable cause is established at the point the officer 
has knowledge of the existence of facts to satisfy the necessary elements of a 
crime.31 Most courts agree that once the officer possesses a reasonable belief 
that a crime has been or is about to be committed, i.e., probable cause, the 
officer has no duty to conduct further investigation before effecting the 
arrest.32 The corollary is that officers may not cherry pick the facts that 
establish probable cause while disregarding those that negate it.33 
 
probable. Their conclusion that probable cause exists need only be reasonable.” (citing Texas v. 
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983))). 
 28. See Sherry F. Colb, Probabilities in Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical Versus Concrete 
Harms, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2010, at 69, 72 n.10 (indicating that for an officer to 
“reasonably believe” something to be true, he must, at the very least, believe it “is more likely to 
be true than it is to be false”). 
 29. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. Notably, however, what constitutes the “totality of the 
circumstances” often depends on how the court interprets the reasonableness standard. See JAMES 
A. ADAMS & DANIEL D. BLINKA, PROSECUTOR’S MANUAL FOR ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6-6(B) 
(2d ed. 2004). 
 30. See, e.g., Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 137–38 (2d Cir. 2003). In Jocks, the plaintiff 
had asserted false arrest claims against two arresting officers. The court found that while the first 
officer lacked probable cause as a result of that officer’s first-hand knowledge of the plaintiff’s 
affirmative defense, the second officer, who arrived later and had no knowledge of the facts giving 
rise to the affirmative defense, was, as a matter of law, not liable for false arrest. 
 31. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 745–46 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Once 
an officer has established probable cause on every element of a crime, he need not continue 
investigating to test the suspect’s claim of innocence.” (citing Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 
432, 437–42 (1986))). 
 32. See, e.g., Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Once probable cause is 
established, an officer is under no duty to investigate further or to look for additional evidence 
which may exculpate the accused.” (citations omitted)); Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 
123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Once a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is 
probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of 
innocence before making an arrest.”). But see infra Section V.B for a discussion on courts who 
have required law enforcement to conduct some minimal investigation before concluding a 
crime had actually been committed. 
 33. Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988) (“As a corollary . . . of the rule 
that the police may rely on the totality of facts available to them in establishing probable cause, 
they also may not disregard facts tending to dissipate probable cause.” (footnote omitted)). 
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As discussed in the next Section, even when it is found the arrest was 
without probable cause, the officer may nonetheless be granted immunity 
from the claim if the court finds the officer was reasonable in believing 
probable cause was present. 
C. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE 
Occupations in law enforcement present many challenges and risks. One 
of these risks is the possibility of being sued for an action taken in the course 
and scope of employment. In an effort to minimize unsubstantiated claims 
and permit law enforcement “liberty to exercise their functions with 
independence and without fear of consequences,” government actors are 
entitled to assert qualified immunity as a barrier to being sued.34 As the name 
implies, this type of immunity is protective, but is not an absolute shelter from 
civil liability. The doctrine of qualified immunity provides protection for 
“government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”35 The standard is specifically designed to “avoid excessive disruption 
of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on 
summary judgment.”36 A primary function of the doctrine is to reduce “the 
risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly 
inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.”37 Thus, qualified immunity, 
at least in theory, offers not only protection from liability, but immunity from 
suit entirely.38 For this reason, the issue of qualified immunity is typically a 
matter resolved “by the court long before trial.”39 
Qualified immunity analysis involves two general inquiries: whether the 
plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, amount to a constitutional violation, and 
 
 34. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (quoting Scott v. Stansfield (1868) 3 LR Exch. 
220 at 223). 
 35. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). 
 38. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) (“Qualified immunity is ‘an immunity from 
suit rather than a mere defense to liability.’” (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985))). 
 39. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991); see also Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 
746 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Qualified immunity protects a defendant from liability as well as from the 
burden of standing trial. For that reason, courts should determine as early on in the proceedings 
as possible whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.” (citations omitted)); Littrell 
v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 584–85 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The law of our circuit is clear. The issue of 
qualified immunity is a question of law for the court, rather than the jury, to decide: ‘[I]t is the 
province of the jury to determine disputed predicate facts, the question of qualified immunity is 
one of law for the court.’” (quoting Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 473 n.6 (8th Cir. 
1995))). But see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 206 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Although it is preferable to resolve the qualified immunity question at the earliest possible stage 
of litigation, this preference does not give judges license to take inherently factual questions away 
from the jury.” (citations omitted)). 
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whether the conduct alleged was objectively reasonable in light of a clearly 
established law at the time that the challenged conduct occurred. Although 
the first inquiry is indeed susceptible to contention, it is the second that has 
become the source for many legal and scholarly debates. This second inquiry 
is better understood as two separate inquiries: (1) whether the allegedly 
violated constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the incident; 
and if so, (2) whether the conduct of the officer was objectively reasonable in 
light of the clearly established law.40 In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court 
mandated that courts first consider the constitutionality of the action prior to 
evaluating whether it was clear law; this mandate was intended to promote the 
development of constitutional law in this area.41 That mandate, however, was 
short-lived. Just eight years later, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court reversed its 
position, therein and thereafter providing trial courts discretion to dispose of 
the claim at the pleading stage if it cannot be shown that the law was clearly 
established.42 The Supreme Court has time and again set a high bar for what 
it means to be “clearly established,” demanding that, “‘[t]he contours of [a] 
right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”43 Recently, in District of 
Columbia v. Wesby, the Court found “[t]he ‘clearly established’ standard also 
requires that the legal principle clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the 
particular circumstances before him,”44 and that the inquiry “requires a high 
‘degree of specificity.’”45 
In suits premised on false arrest, the rule provides that an officer should 
not be held personally liable where he reasonably, but mistakenly, concludes 
that probable cause was present for the arrest.46 The defense provides “ample 
room for mistaken judgments” and aims to “protect[] ‘all but the plainly 
 
 40. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244. 
 41. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“A court required to rule upon the qualified 
immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to 
the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional 
right? This must be the initial inquiry.” (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991))). 
 42. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (“[W]hile the sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often 
appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the district courts and 
the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which 
of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the 
circumstances in the particular case at hand.”). As one can imagine, most courts, in the name of 
judicial efficiency, often choose to pass over the constitutional question if it can be determined 
that the law was not clearly established, resulting in a dearth of development of constitutional law 
in this area. 
 43. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (alterations in original) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 
 44. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018). 
 45. Id. (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015) (per curiam)). 
 46. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638–39. The intent of the immunity defense is to shield from 
liability police officers “who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful.” Id. at 641 (citing 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1986)). 
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incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”47 Expressed another 
way, qualified immunity should be granted if “officers of reasonable 
competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.”48 
Thus, qualified immunity aims to protect those officers who make a 
reasonable error in determining whether there is probable cause to arrest.49 
Frequently, the defense of qualified immunity and an officer’s defense on the 
merits to the false arrest claim become indistinct.50 It is often observed that a 
plaintiff who can overcome a qualified immunity defense in the early stages 
of litigation, will ultimately satisfy the second element of a § 1983 false arrest 
claim, where both hinge on the existence or absence of probable cause. Of 
course, a multitude of factors will vary the outcome, including substantiation 
of the facts as alleged, as well as who bears the burden of proof on the 
probable cause determination.51 Defeating qualified immunity is no easy task. 
To overcome the defense, a plaintiff must “point[] to a clearly analogous case 
establishing a right to be free from the specific conduct at issue” or show that 
“the conduct [at issue] is so egregious that no reasonable person could have 
believed that it would not violate clearly established rights.”52 
In essence, and in practice, the qualified immunity defense gives law 
enforcement two bites at the reasonableness apple: Even if it is found that the 
evidence was insufficient for a reasonable officer to conclude the suspect had 
committed a crime (i.e., no probable cause), the officer may still escape 
liability if it is found the mistake was a reasonable one, or that the relevant law 
was not clearly established at the time of arrest. 
Consider the following example: An officer arrests a suspect for 
possession of stolen property, even though he had no evidence of the 
suspect’s intent to possess property that was stolen. If specific intent were 
required to establish probable cause in that jurisdiction, a court may find the 
officer lacked probable cause for the arrest, yet rule he is entitled to immunity 
protection if it found a reasonable officer would also have not known that 
 
 47. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 343, 341). 
 48. Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted); see also Malley, 475 
U.S. at 341 (“Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no 
reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of 
reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.”). 
 49. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 642–43. 
 50. Kenneth Duvall, Burdens of Proof and Qualified Immunity, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 135, 142 (2012) 
(“Despite these (at least theoretical) differences between an affirmative defense on the merits 
and a qualified immunity from suit, the two concepts are often interchanged, if not outright 
conflated.”). 
 51. See supra Section II.A for a brief discussion on who bears the burden of proof on the 
issue of probable cause. 
 52. Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Saffell v. Crews, 183 
F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
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evidence of mens rea was necessary to establish probable cause.53 Since the test 
is objective, the officer in this example may be entitled to immunity even if he 
subjectively was aware the law in his jurisdiction required evidence of intent 
for probable cause, as long as it could be shown that a reasonable officer 
would not have been wise to the law. Qualified immunity would offer similar 
protection in scenarios involving an available affirmative defense where it is 
found that a reasonable officer would not have been aware of the law that gave 
rise to the affirmative defense. 
D. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO A CRIME 
“[A]n ‘affirmative defense’ is any defense that assumes the [commission 
of the act] . . . but raises other facts that, if true, would” negate the element 
of intent, or “establish a valid excuse or justification or a right to engage in 
the conduct in question.”54 In other words, an affirmative defense admits the 
act, but refutes the act was criminal.55 Common affirmative defenses include: 
(i) justification defenses such as self-defense, defense of property, or necessity; 
(ii) excuse defenses such as insanity, duress, diminished capacity, 
intoxication, and infancy;56 and, (iii) statutory affirmative defenses such as 
those which provide authorization or permission for what would otherwise be 
 
 53. See, e.g., Rodis v. City of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Rodis involved 
the arrest of a suspect for the crime of possession of counterfeit currency, a specific intent crime. 
The court acknowledged “that ‘when specific intent is a required element of the offense, the 
arresting officer must have probable cause for that element in order to reasonably believe that a 
crime has occurred.’” Id. (quoting Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
While it determined the officers lacked probable cause on that element, and thus lacked probable 
cause for the arrest, the court nonetheless granted qualified immunity to the officers on its 
finding that the law in this area was not sufficiently clear to impose civil liability. 
 54. Stephen Michael Everhart, Putting a Burden of Production on the Defendant Before Admitting 
Evidence that Someone Else Committed the Crime Charged: Is It Constitutional?, 76 NEB. L. REV. 272, 290 
(1997) (quoting State v. Cohen, 568 So. 2d 49, 51–52 (Fla. 1990)). 
 55. There remains some disagreement on the issue of whether an affirmative defense 
negates the criminality of the act, or merely serves as a legal excuse for committing a criminal act. 
This Author is of the view that if an affirmative defense establishes the suspect was not guilty of a 
crime, it follows then that the act committed was not a criminal act, even if under different 
circumstances the same act would have been deemed criminal. This is not to say that an act that 
is made not criminal by virtue of an affirmative defense becomes lawful; an act in violation of a 
criminal code remains unlawful, but is not criminal if performed with a legal excuse or 
justification. 
 56. Worth noting is that an excuse defense will almost never defeat probable cause; not 
because excuse defenses are irrelevant to the analysis, but because it would be nearly impossible 
for an arresting officer to be aware of sufficient facts at the scene of the arrest that would permit 
an objectively reasonable officer to conclude an excuse defense was available. Moreover, while a 
statutory defense or justification may make an otherwise criminal act not criminal, the same 
cannot be said for an excuse defense, such as intoxication or insanity. Such defenses acknowledge 
a “crime” has been committed but excuse the individual’s actions due to the individual’s mental 
capacity or state of mind at the moment of the act. 
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deemed unlawful conduct.57 Unlike a traverse, an affirmative defense 
traditionally does not concern itself with the elements of the offense at all, it 
concedes them.58 “In effect, an affirmative defense says, ‘Yes, I did it, but I had 
a good reason.’”59 However, some courts have found that an affirmative 
defense, such as self-defense, can actually negate the mens rea element for the 
crime charged.60 Essentially, “I did the act, but my intent was to protect myself, 
not commit a crime.” 
Courts often confuse “satisfaction of the elements of crime” with the 
“commission of a crime,” in discussing probable cause, but the two are quite 
distinct. The former indicates the suspect has committed acts for which he 
could be found guilty of a crime absent a legal justification; the latter indicates 
the suspect acted unlawfully and without legal justification. Though a suspect 
may have committed an act satisfying the elements of a particular criminal 
code, if the suspect is found not guilty of the crime as a result of an established 
defense, it cannot be said the suspect committed a crime, or that his conduct 
was criminal.61 With few exceptions,62 a proven affirmative defense removes 
all criminal culpability. Thus, an otherwise criminal act that is justified or 
permitted by an affirmative defense is no crime at all.63 This point is crucial 
to understanding and contemplating the inclusion of an affirmative defense 
 
 57. Examples of statutory affirmative defenses include: a license to possess a firearm; 
authorization to possess a firearm by virtue of employment (e.g., police officer or security guard); 
or authorization to possess a controlled substance (e.g., via a medical marijuana card or a valid 
prescription for Vicodin or OxyContin or another Schedule II or Schedule III prescribed 
narcotic). Without the statutory affirmative defense, these acts are criminal. In jurisdictions where 
affirmative defenses are deemed irrelevant or only arguably relevant in determining probable 
cause, officers are not required to consider the presentment of a license or prescription prior to 
effecting arrest. See, e.g., State v. Fry, 174 P.3d 1258, 1260 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding 
“the mere production of a document purporting to be a marijuana use authorization does not 
prohibit further investigation by the State. . . . Whether the affirmative defense of medical use of 
marijuana was viable was an issue for trial”). 
 58. White v. Arn, 788 F.2d 338, 344–45 (6th Cir. 1986) (explaining that a defendant 
claiming self-defense does not dispute or negate the elements of the crime charged, but instead 
seeks to establish the elements of self-defense). 
 59. Cohen, 568 So. 2d at 52. 
 60. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 108 (1982) (finding that under Ohio law, a claim 
of self-defense challenged the mens rea requirement for culpability, and thus put the burden on 
the state to disprove the defense). But see Thomas v. Arn, 704 F.2d 865, 875 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(“Self-defense does not negate an element of aggravated assault; instead it excuses and makes 
non-criminal an act which would otherwise be criminal.”). 
 61. See supra note 55. 
 62. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 63. See State v. Ouellette, 37 A.3d 921, 926 (Me. 2012) (“Self-defense, like other 
justifications, is a complete defense, meaning that it negates the commission of the crime; an act 
committed in self-defense is ‘simply no crime at all.’” (quoting State v. Singleton, 974 A.2d 679, 
690 (Conn. 2009))); see also Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 98 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Affirmative 
defenses are complete defenses that, once proven by the defendant by a preponderance of the 
evidence, negate criminal liability for an offense, notwithstanding that the State has otherwise 
proven all the elements of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
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in probable cause analysis, where the fundamental inquiry is whether the 
arresting officer reasonably believed the suspect was guilty of committing a 
crime.64 
III. THOMAS V. CITY OF GALVESTON 
The case of Thomas v. City of Galveston illustrates when an officer’s alleged 
knowledge of an affirmative defense may negate probable cause in a § 1983 
civil action for false arrest.65 Thomas involved an incident which occurred in 
Galveston, Texas in the wake of Hurricane Ike.66 Galveston is an island off the 
coast of Texas and has endured 14 catastrophic hurricanes over the last 100 
years.67 Hurricane Ike struck the island on September 13, 2008 and was 
devastating, completely destroying 2,228 homes.68 Prior to the hurricane 
making landfall, the mayor of Galveston issued a mandatory evacuation of the 
island—everyone was to leave except for police and fire personnel, and a 
handful of city officials. Although the evacuation was labeled mandatory, it 
was not a crime to stay. Kerry Thomas and his wife chose to stay on the island 
and ride out the storm. Their decision to stay was motivated in part by 
concerns that their home would be vandalized and looted if they left it vacant, 
as was the case when they evacuated for Hurricane Rita in 2005. 
When the 110 mile per hour winds finally died down and the 17-foot 
surge of water subsided, Mr. Thomas made his way to the nearest supply store 
and purchased a 15,000 kilo-watt generator which would be used to power his 
home until utilities were restored.69 He left the generator on a flatbed trailer 
parked directly in front of his house.70 To give the appearance it was secured, 
Mr. Thomas hung across the unit two heavy log chains, which doubled as a 
 
 64. See Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under California 
law, an officer has probable cause for a warrantless arrest ‘if the facts known to him would lead a 
[person] of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and 
strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.’” (alteration in original) (quoting People v. 
Adams, 175 Cal. App. 3d 855, 861 (1985))); Penn v. Harris, 296 F.3d 573, 576–77 (7th Cir. 
2002) (“Probable cause exists when, based on the facts known, a reasonable person would believe 
a person was guilty of committing an offense.” (citing Cervantes v. Jones, 188 F.3d 805, 811 (7th 
Cir. 1999))); see also Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901) (stating that extradition is proper 
“only upon evidence establishing probable cause to believe him guilty of the offence charged”). 
 65. Thomas v. City of Galveston, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 835–38 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 
 66. Id. at 829. 
 67. TEX. HURRICANE CTR. FOR INNOVATIVE TECH., TEXAS COASTAL COUNTIES WITH DIRECT 
HURRICANE HITS (1900–2008) (2008), available at http://hurricane.egr.uh.edu/sites/hurricane. 
egr.uh.edu/files/files/counties.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS8A-E8H2]. 
 68. DIV. OF EMERGENCY MGMT., STATE OF TEX., HURRICANE IKE: IMPACT REPORT 18 (2008), 
available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/hazard/hurricane/2008/ike/impact_report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/26DM-Z9M7]. 
 69. According to Mr. Thomas, he had also promised his neighbors free use of the generator 
to run their necessary appliances and charge their cellular phones. 
 70. Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 830. 
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crude alarm. Curfew having been set at 8:00 PM, Mr. Thomas and his wife 
turned in early.71 
Around 10:00 PM, Mr. Thomas awoke to the sound of barking dogs.72 He 
looked out his second-floor bedroom window and saw what looked like two 
men with flashlights lurking around where he had parked the trailer.73 He 
then heard the metal on metal sound of the log chain being slowly removed 
from atop his generator. Mr. Thomas put on his slippers and proceeded 
downstairs.74 Through the window next to the front door Mr. Thomas yelled 
at the individuals to identify themselves.75 The flashlights stopped moving, but 
there was no response.76 Mr. Thomas repeated the request numerous times 
over a period of several minutes.77 No response. He located his rifle which he 
had kept near the front door, opened the door and stood just inside the 
doorway with the rifle at port arms.78 Hoping to scare off who he thought to 
be looters, he stated, “[I]dentify yourself or you will be fired upon.”79 
Immediately the flashlights began to move again, but the individuals did not 
run away. Instead, one exclaimed, “Galveston Police, throw down your gun.”80 
This was the first and only time the individuals lurking around the Thomas’ 
generator had identified themselves as law enforcement.81 
Mr. Thomas immediately bent down, placed his rifle on the porch, and 
put his hands in the air with his palms forward.82 According to Mr. Thomas, 
the two apparent looters, now in the role of police officers, threw him from 
his porch, beat him unconscious, and took him to jail.83 He was released 
several days later and all charges were dismissed “in the interest of justice.”84 
Mr. Thomas subsequently brought a § 1983 claim alleging false arrest 
and excessive force, among other claims.85 In a Motion to Dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the police officers sought qualified 
immunity from the false arrest claim, asserting probable cause to arrest Mr. 
 
 71. Id. at 830. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. Port arms is a military term describing the act of holding a rifle diagonally in front 
of the body with the muzzle pointing upward and to the left. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, DRILL AND 
CEREMONIES fig.5-4 (2003), available at https://www.usarmyband.com/pdf/FM_3_21_5.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U9H2-SBFF]. 
 79. Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 830. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 831. 
 85. Id. 
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Thomas for violating curfew and for committing a terroristic threat.86 As to 
the charge of violating curfew, the district court ruled that no reasonable 
officer could have believed a man standing in his own doorway was in violation 
of curfew.87 However, much more complex was the issue of whether the 
yelling of “identify yourself or you will be fired upon” was sufficient to give rise 
to probable cause in light of Mr. Thomas’ allegations the officers knew the 
threat was in direct response to the officers’ own mischievous conduct. The 
issue before the federal district court was whether probable cause analysis 
required consideration of the officers’ first-hand knowledge of Mr. Thomas’ 
affirmative defense of defense of property.88 
Although this particular issue had yet to be resolved in the Fifth Circuit 
when Thomas was decided, other courts had found probable cause analysis 
requires the evaluation of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, and in 
Jocks v. Tavernier, the Second Circuit found “a police officer’s awareness of the 
facts supporting a defense can eliminate probable cause.”89 The facts in Thomas 
were comparable to those in Jocks, wherein the court found relevant the 
allegations that the arresting officer knew the suspect was acting in defense to 
the officer’s own misconduct.90 Allowing Jocks to proceed to trial, the Second 
Circuit found that “a reasonable jury could have concluded that [the officer] 
should have known that Jocks was acting in self-defense” and “could therefore 
find that the arrest lacked probable cause.”91 Similarly, in Thomas, the court 
held “[p]laintiff’s actions were allegedly provoked entirely by the conduct of 
the officers, so the officers would have known that [the] Plaintiff only made a 
threat of force in defense of his property and had those [sic] done nothing 
wrong.”92 In view of the facts presented, and in line with the logic expressed 
by a handful of other courts on this issue, the district court in Thomas 
concluded there were circumstances in which facts pertaining to an affirmative 
defense were pertinent in probable cause analysis.93 The court opined, “[a]t 
a minimum, if the arresting officer knows of facts that conclusively establish 
that an affirmative defense applies, it cannot accurately be said that the officer 
has probable cause that the suspect committed the offense.”94 
 
 86. Id. at 834. 
 87. Id. at 836–38. 
 88. See id. at 834–36. 
 89. Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). 
 90. In Jocks, the officer unlawfully and unreasonably pointed his pistol at Jocks and 
threatened to blow his head off; in response, Jocks threw the handset of a payphone at the officer 
and ran for his life. Id. at 132–36. 
 91. Id. at 136. 
 92. Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 836. 
 93. Id. at 835–37. 
 94. Id. at 836. In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the false arrest claim, the 
district court found Mr. Thomas’ allegations pertaining to the officers’ own culpable conduct 
were sufficient to establish the officers’ awareness of the affirmative defense of defense of 
property which consequently negated any claim of probable cause. Id. at 837. The court ruled 
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The ruling exemplifies what appears to be the plurality view on the issue: 
An officer’s knowledge of an available affirmative defense is relevant in the 
probable cause analysis.95 This plurality view, however, stops short of the rule 
proposed by this Article. Even courts concluding an affirmative defense is 
relevant in the analysis incorporate the caveat that the facts of the affirmative 
defense must first be deemed “conclusive.”96 Courts routinely find that while 
inculpatory facts are to be evaluated using a “probable” or “reasonably 
credible” standard, exculpatory facts should be evaluated using a separate 
“conclusive” standard.97 As discussed in greater detail in Part IV, the totality 
of circumstances test does not require nor permit such differing standards for 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence; instead, the entirety of the facts 
available must be evaluated under the objectively prudent officer standard. 
What follows is discussion and examination of the relevance of an 
affirmative defense in probable cause analysis, and the proposition that 
inclusion is not only required by the totality of circumstances approach but is 
the most appropriate method of determining Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness. 
IV. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE RELEVANCE IN PROBABLE  
CAUSE ANALYSIS 
The basic inquiry in determining probable cause ex post in a civil action 
for false arrest is a simple one: Upon review of all the facts and circumstances 
available to the arresting officer, was the seizure reasonable? Probable cause 
analysis should not burden law enforcement with the onus of selecting at the 
scene of the arrest which facts to consider and which to disregard, nor should 
it require the officer to weigh differently inculpatory and exculpatory facts. 
Instead, the analysis should permit, and arguably require, the officer to 
consider unrestricted the totality of facts available. It is upon a review of this 
totality of facts that the officer shall make a reasonable determination as to 
whether it is probable that the suspect had committed a crime. The following 
Sections explain why the rule proposed by this Article is in alignment with the 
totality of facts and circumstances test, why differing evaluative standards for 
 
that Thomas had alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for false arrest and to foreclose the 
defendants’ immunity defense. Id. The defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied and the case 
was allowed to proceed to trial. Id. at 846. Following some initial discovery, the defendants 
proposed settlement, and the matter was ultimately resolved prior to trial. 
 95. In each of the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, at least one federal 
court has ruled that an affirmative defense to a crime is relevant in probable cause analysis. 
 96. See, e.g., Williams v. Sirmons, 307 F. App’x 354, 358 (11th Cir. 2009); Hodgkins ex rel. 
Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A police officer may not ignore 
conclusively established evidence of the existence of an affirmative defense . . . .” (citations 
omitted)); Jocks, 316 F.3d at 135; Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 874 (6th Cir. 2002); Thomas, 
800 F. Supp. 2d at 836. 
 97. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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inculpatory and exculpatory facts is improper, and how an available 
affirmative defense may impact the criminality of an act. 
A. TOTALITY OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES TEST 
As previously noted, probable cause analysis requires an objective 
consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances available to the officer 
at the moment of arrest. Totality, meaning “an aggregate amount,”98 is all-
inclusive. Thus, the rule compels a review of each and every fact available to 
the officer, whether inculpatory, exculpatory, or neutral. The totality 
requirement was avowed by the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, where  
the Court “reaffirm[ed] the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that 
traditionally has informed probable cause determinations.”99 Though the 
Gates ruling pertained to probable cause for a search, the standard has been 
applied universally to all Fourth Amendment protections.100 Even when the 
“totality” descriptor is not present, when the Court describes what must be 
considered in determining probable cause, it consistently does so with 
language implying the review shall be all-inclusive.101 Even Fourth 
Amendment intrusions that are not subject to strict application of probable 
cause are evaluated for “reasonableness, under all the circumstances.”102 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule explicitly on the probable 
cause-affirmative defense issue,103 adoption of the True Totality Rule would 
generally comport with the Court’s proclivity to require review of everything in 
determining Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Even as recent Supreme 
Court precedent has subtly eroded Fourth Amendment protections and 
substantially lowered the bar for probable cause, it remains steadfast in the 
 
 98. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2016); ROGETS II, THE NEW THESAURUS 1024 
(1988) (“An amount or quantity from which nothing is left out or held back.”). 
 99. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (citations omitted). 
 100. See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (applying the totality of facts and 
circumstances test in evaluating probable cause of an arrest while citing the Gates decision). 
 101. See, e.g., Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013) (holding that courts should not 
prescribe “an inflexible set of evidentiary requirements” when evaluating probable cause, noting 
that “every inquiry into probable cause” requires consideration of “all the facts”); see also Ornelas 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700–01 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[P]robable cause  
. . . involve[s] a two-step process. First, a court must identify all of the relevant historical facts 
known to the officer . . . .”). 
 102. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985); see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U.S. 266, 298 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (“The clear rule of the circuit, however, 
is that conveyances may be stopped and examined for aliens without warrant or probable cause 
when in all the circumstances it is reasonable to do so.” (emphasis added)). 
 103. In District of Columbia v. Wesby, the Court was presented with a set of facts similar to those 
addressed by this Article. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 583–85 (2018). Though 
not specifically acknowledging the issue as one involving an affirmative defense (the Court 
referred to it as an “innocent explanation”), its holding there may offer some insight on how it 
might view the relevance of an affirmative defense in probable cause analysis. Id. at 588. The 
Wesby matter is discussed further in Section VI.A below. 
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notion that courts should not review in isolation each fact known to the 
arresting officer, but should instead “consider ‘the whole picture’” in 
evaluating probable cause.104 In fact, the Court in District of Columbia v. Wesby, 
admonished the lower court for evaluating the facts one by one, finding “[t]he 
totality-of-the-circumstances test ‘precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer 
analysis.’”105 
Supreme Court precedent aside, the true totality approach in evaluating 
probable cause is appropriate because it provides the most practical, 
straightforward method for law enforcement to evaluate the situation. 
Officers should be free to make a determination based on all the evidence 
available to them, and not be forced to weigh evidence differently based on 
whether it indicates guilt or innocence. A rule requiring an officer to exclude 
certain facts from the analysis could inhibit an officer’s reasonable 
determination of probable cause, where she would have to pick and choose 
what evidence she is allowed to consider, as opposed to simply making a 
reasonable judgment based upon everything she has observed. Officers 
should be given reasonable discretion in assessing the probability of whether 
the suspect would actually be found guilty of a crime observed and should not 
be limited or restricted by the formalistic distinction between the elements of 
a crime and the elements of an affirmative defense. 
The trial court in Diop v. City of New York, applying a rule bearing 
similarities to that proposed by this Article, found that the officer’s awareness 
of Diop’s affirmative defense of necessity prohibited the court from finding 
as a matter of law that the officer had probable cause for the arrest.106 Diop 
was observed running a red light, fleeing the scene of an accident, and driving 
the wrong way down a one-way street.107 These facts standing alone would no 
doubt amount to probable cause. However, the officer was also aware that 
Diop had been robbed and was acting at the direction of one of the robbers 
holding a knife to his neck. The court held: 
These facts should have indicated to Officer Blake that Diop’s 
reckless driving was ‘necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an 
imminent . . . private injury’ and thus was not criminal under N.Y. 
Penal Law § 35.05(2). In light of these facts, which Officer Blake was 
required to consider in determining whether there was probable 
cause, the Court is unable to conclude as a matter of law that Officer 
Blake had probable cause to arrest Diop.108 
 
 104. Id. at 588 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
 105. Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). 
 106. Diop v. City of New York, 50 F. Supp. 3d 411, 419–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 107. Id. at 419. 
 108. Id. at 419–20 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). Of course, to negate probable 
cause, the facts must establish the unlawful conduct was in fact necessary. See Holman v. City of 
York, 564 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that facts of affirmative defense were insufficient 
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If the ultimate goal of the probable cause requirement is to limit 
warrantless arrests to only those found objectively reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, the most appropriate rule is one that would not only 
permit but require an officer to consider the entirety of the facts available. 
The true totality approach is also appropriate because it goes to the heart of 
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement. Only upon a review of 
all the facts and circumstances available to the officer should it be judged 
whether a warrantless arrest was reasonable. As it stands, there exists no 
Supreme Court jurisprudence signaling exceptions to or exclusions from its 
totality standard for determining probable cause,109 and most circuits have 
found the standard mandates consideration of both inculpatory and 
exculpatory facts.110 
B. “CONCLUSIVITY” REQUIREMENT 
Even courts that have agreed an affirmative defense is relevant in 
probable cause analysis will often weigh differently the inculpatory and 
exculpatory evidence available to the officer; that is, reasonably credible 
evidence is sufficient for an officer to believe the elements of a crime are 
present for the purpose of establishing probable cause, yet only conclusive 
evidence of an affirmative defense can negate it.111 Courts often equate 
 
to compel a reasonable officer to conclude it was necessary to trespass onto private property in 
order to avoid risk of injury). 
 109. The only opinion of the Court that teeters on this proposition is United States v. Williams, 
where, in a five to four ruling, the Court found a prosecutor’s failure to disclose to the grand jury 
substantial exculpatory evidence in its possession insufficient to dismiss an otherwise valid 
indictment. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992). The Court found the responsibility 
of a grand jury is “to assess whether there is adequate basis for bringing a criminal charge” and 
historically “it has always been thought sufficient to hear only the prosecutor’s side.” Id. at 37, 51. 
Moreover, “‘[i]t would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution’ to permit 
an indictment to be challenged ‘on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent 
evidence before the grand jury.’” Id. at 54 (alteration in original) (quoting Costello v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 359, 363–64 (1956)). It is upon this historical precedent pertaining specifically 
to the grand jury process the ruling is based, not on a newly proscribed rule permitting a 
prosecutor to purposefully hide from the grand jury evidence establishing no crime was 
committed. As Justice Stevens explained in his dissent, “[r]equiring the prosecutor to ferret out 
and present all evidence that could be used at trial to create a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant’s guilt would be inconsistent with the purpose of the grand jury proceeding . . . . But 
that does not mean that the prosecutor may mislead the grand jury into believing that there is 
probable cause to indict by withholding clear evidence to the contrary.” Id. at 69 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Justice Stevens goes on to quote a passage from the U.S. Department of Justice, 
United States Attorneys’ Manual: “[W]hen a prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is 
personally aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt of a subject of the 
investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury 
before seeking an indictment against such a person.” Id. at 69–70. 
 110. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 111. See, e.g., Williams v. Sirmons, 307 F. App’x 354, 359 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[I]n determining 
whether probable cause to arrest exists, an officer must consider all facts and circumstances 
within that officer’s knowledge, including facts and circumstances conclusively establishing an 
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conclusive with the officer having observed the evidence first-hand.112 This 
conclusivity requirement has the propensity to result in constitutional 
violations without any avenue for recovery, particularly in cases where an 
officer is permitted to disregard evidence that clearly signals the presence of 
an affirmative defense. For example, suppose an officer arrives on the scene 
of a fight that had just ended. The first party claims the other assaulted him. 
The other, with visible facial injuries, claims he was only acting in self-defense, 
and a half dozen bystanders corroborate that claim. In jurisdictions invoking 
the conclusivity requirement, if the statement of the first party was deemed 
reasonably credible, it alone would be sufficient to justify the arrest of the second, 
despite the abundance of evidence he was acting in self-defense; such courts 
would likely find that since the officer did not observe the exculpatory 
evidence first-hand, the defense would likely not be deemed conclusive. 
The above example highlights why this “first-hand knowledge/ 
conclusivity” requirement is unreasonable. Certainly, an officer’s first-hand 
knowledge of an event may be given more credence than an account by a 
witness, but this does not mean the witness account should carry no weight at 
all. The witness statement should be reviewed in conjunction with the entirety 
of the evidence available, and an assessment should be made upon that totality 
review. If the statement of a witness is deemed sufficient to establish probable 
cause, then, under certain circumstances, a statement from a witness should 
also be sufficient to establish a probable cause-negating affirmative defense.113 
A rule limiting affirmative defense inclusion to only those scenarios when the 
facts are observed first-hand by the arresting officer would permit the officer 
in the second scenario to subject both men to the awfulness of arrest, even 
though one was clearly a victim. 
 
affirmative defense.” (emphasis added)); Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 
2004) (“A police officer may not ignore conclusively established evidence of the existence of an 
affirmative defense . . . .” (emphasis added)); Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 
(6th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he officers in this case had full knowledge of facts and circumstances that 
conclusively established, at the time of the [plaintiffs’] arrests, that the plaintiffs were justified—by 
statute—in carrying concealed weapons during their work.” (emphasis added)). See also Judge 
Smith’s concurring opinion in Mazuka v. Rice Twp. Police Dep’t for an in-depth analysis on the 
infusion of an affirmative defense in probable cause analysis, and her conclusion that “an 
affirmative defense is only applicable to the probable cause analysis when a reasonable officer 
making an arrest without a warrant would conclusively know that the affirmative defense excuses 
the offending conduct.” Mazuka v. Rice Twp. Police Dep’t, 655 F. App’x 892, 897 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(Smith, J., concurring). No court has expressly adopted the proposition that evidence of an 
affirmative defense should be weighed equally among evidence tending to establish guilt. 
 112. See, e.g., Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 137–38 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Hodgkins, 355 
F.3d at 1061 (concluding that a conclusive affirmative defense must be considered, but absent 
first-hand knowledge of the facts giving rise to the defense “the officer is free to arrest her and 
leave the assessment of the . . . affirmative defense for a judicial officer”). 
 113. Again, where there are conflicting credible statements, and the determination of guilt 
is not clear, the officer will be given significant leeway in determining reasonableness for the 
arrest, particularly where there is reason to believe arrest is prudent under the circumstances. 
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Requiring conclusivity is unnecessary in most circumstances, where the 
tests for probable cause and qualified immunity are both founded in 
reasonableness: whether it was reasonable for the officer to believe the conduct 
observed was criminal, despite evidence of an available affirmative defense to 
the conduct (probable cause), and whether reasonable officers could disagree 
as to whether the conduct observed was made lawful by an available 
affirmative defense (qualified immunity). Thus, the test need not be one of 
conclusivity or even reasonable conclusivity of the affirmative defense, but 
rather, probability that a crime had been committed in view of the totality of the 
facts—both inculpatory and exculpatory.114 Just as the traditional probable 
cause determination contemplates whether the facts available would lead a 
reasonable officer to believe an unlawful act had been committed, this analysis 
would consider whether a reasonable officer would have believed an 
affirmative defense was available to justify that unlawful act. In cases 
presenting a close call, the officer would be given substantial deference, as 
probable cause jurisprudence has always provided. This is especially true in 
situations involving exigent or urgent circumstances. 
Under exigent circumstances, or when the officer has reason to believe 
the suspect is likely to escape arrest or commit further criminal acts, it may be 
found reasonable for the officer to institute arrest despite strong evidence of 
an available affirmative defense. Conversely, if no such circumstances are 
present, it may be found unreasonable for the officer to ignore even weak 
indication of an affirmative defense.115 
C. EFFECT OF AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ON THE CRIMINALITY OF AN ACT 
At trial on the criminal charge, if evidence of an affirmative defense is 
determined sufficient to legally justify the act, the jury should find no crime 
was committed—not guilty. As a corollary, if facts are observed at the scene 
which establish an affirmative defense to the crime, a reasonable officer 
should conclude no crime was committed—no probable cause. Only a 
reasonable belief that a crime has been or is about to be committed  
 
 114. There is no reason for the two-part test proposed by the court in Thomas and by Judge 
Smith in her concurring opinion in Mazuka. Mazuka, 655 F. App’x  at 895–900. What Judge Smith 
describes in her concurring opinion is a test whereby the officer would have to first determine 
whether it was probable that the elements of the crime were present, and then evaluate separately 
whether the available exculpatory evidence conclusively establishes an affirmative defense. A 
much simpler approach is to allow the officer to review the totality of the evidence equally, and 
perform a single evaluation based on probability and reasonableness, as the Constitution requires. 
 115. See, e.g., Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999). In Kuehl, the court held 
“officers have a duty to conduct a reasonably thorough investigation prior to arresting a suspect, 
at least in the absence of exigent circumstances . . . .” Id. Here, the court found the officers failed 
to interview an eyewitness to an altercation who would have confirmed the act was in self-defense. 
Id. The court concluded that such minimal investigation “would not have unduly hampered the 
process of law enforcement.” Id. at 651. 
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shall permit an officer to lawfully effect an arrest.116 It follows then, the 
determination of whether an officer believed a crime had been committed 
must comprise a review of all evidence, including that which may make the 
observed act not criminal.117 Certain courts have mistakenly excluded from 
the analysis evidence of an available affirmative defense on the grounds that 
an officer has no duty to conduct further investigation or evaluate the merits 
of an affirmative defense once the elements of the crime are satisfied.118 
Merely observing conduct that satisfies the elements of a crime, however, is 
not always sufficient to form a reasonable basis to believe the conduct is 
criminal, especially when additional facts are available indicating the conduct 
was not criminal.119 
A police officer needs only probable cause to effect the arrest, as opposed 
to a belief beyond a reasonable doubt;120 though the evaluative standards are 
distinct, the underlying inquiry at both the moment of the arrest and at the 
criminal proceeding is the same: Is the suspect (or accused) guilty of 
committing a crime?121 Presumably, the primary objectives of an arrest are to 
 
 116. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“The Fourth Amendment protects 
‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.’ In conformity with the rule at common law, a warrantless 
arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause 
to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” (alteration in original) (citing 
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417–24 (1976); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
175–76 (1949))). 
 117. See Diop v. City of New York, 50 F. Supp. 3d 411, 419–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), discussed in 
detail at supra Section IV.A. Notably, other courts have expressed the opposite view, finding that 
an affirmative defense does not decriminalize an otherwise criminal act. See, e.g., State v. Fry, 228 
P.3d 1, 6 (Wash. 2010) (“An affirmative defense does not per se legalize an activity and does not 
negate probable cause that a crime has been committed.”); see also United States v. Mahmood, 
No. 07-MJ-603, 2009 WL 1118085, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2009) (“Facts giving rise to an 
affirmative defense, however, do not negate probable cause; an affirmative defense ‘is an excuse 
for a crime, not a denial of one.’” (quoting Labensky v. County of Nassau, 6 F. Supp. 2d 161, 177 
(E.D.N.Y. 1998))). Worth noting, the Labensky holding pertained specifically to the defense of 
entrapment, an affirmative defense which several courts have viewed differently in this context. 
 118. See, e.g., Morris v. Town of Lexington, 748 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Cooper, 293 F. App’x 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Robinson, 600 
A.2d 957, 959 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)); Commonwealth v. Romero, 673 A.2d 374, 377 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1996); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., No. 1:09-CV-594-TWT, 
2009 WL 5033444, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2009). 
 119. See Diop, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 419–20, discussed in detail at supra Section IV.A. 
 120. Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he law recognizes that 
probable cause determinations have to be made ‘on the spot’ under pressure and do ‘not require 
the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance 
standard demands.’” (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975))). 
 121. In McCarthy v. De Armit, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania summed up the definition 
of probable cause in this way: “The substance of all the definitions is a reasonable ground for 
belief of guilt.” McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881) (cited approvingly in Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925)). To be clear, the officer need not predict with certainty whether 
the suspect would be found guilty, but instead need only make a reasonable determination of 
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ensure prosecution for a crime and to protect the public from continued 
criminal conduct. If the totality of the evidence observed by the officer reveals 
a complete affirmative defense to an alleged crime, neither objective is 
indulged by arresting the suspect for the sole reason that certain elements of 
the crime are observed. If the true inquiry is whether the officer reasonably 
believed the conduct was criminal (and thus justifying arrest for the purpose 
of ensuring prosecution or protecting the public), the inquiry must include 
available facts that could establish the conduct was in fact not criminal. 
Maintaining focus on the “totality” and “reasonableness” requirements 
has underpinned the success of some plaintiffs on this issue; still, many courts 
are reluctant to include evidence of an affirmative defense in the analysis, 
often due to misplaced reliance on principles appearing to, but that do not, 
require exclusion. Part V explains how the True Totality Rule is actually in 
harmony with certain principles on which courts often rely when refusing  
to consider evidence of an affirmative defense in the probable cause 
determination.122 
V. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE INCLUSION SQUARES WITH TRADITIONAL  
PROBABLE CAUSE PRINCIPLES 
There are certain universally accepted interrelated probable cause 
concepts that some courts have found to be in conflict with affirmative 
defense inclusion in probable cause analysis. To the contrary, the Rule aligns 
and can be uniformly reconciled with the general principles of each. One 
position commonly asserted by defendant officers (and regularly adopted by 
courts) is that an affirmative defense is a mechanism to be invoked at trial to 
determine guilt, and is therefore not relevant at the scene of an arrest on the 
determination of probable cause.123 Another is the notion that once an officer 
has probable cause for the arrest, he has no duty to investigate further or to 
rule out claims of innocence.124 The third is the often unqualified assertion 
that an officer’s subjective motives are irrelevant in probable cause analysis.125 
As will be discussed below, these general principles remain substantially 
undisturbed even upon adoption of the True Totality Rule. 
A. AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IS ASSERTED AT TRIAL IN  
DEFENSE OF THE CRIME 
An argument often made against affirmative defense inclusion in the 
probable cause analysis is that an affirmative defense is to be presented at trial 
 
whether it is probable that they be found guilty based on the totality of facts and circumstances 
available to the officer at the time of the arrest. 
 122. See infra Part V. 
 123. See infra Section V.A. 
 124. See infra Section V.B. 
 125. See infra Section V.C. 
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on the issue of guilt, not evaluated on the scene of an arrest.126 It is true that 
an affirmative defense is typically asserted by the defendant in response to a 
criminal complaint, and facts supporting the defense are evaluated in 
criminal proceedings in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Often, 
however, these facts are also available to the officer prior to effecting the 
arrest. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to require an officer to predict with 
certainty at the moment of arrest how a jury would resolve a factual dispute 
on the issue; nonetheless, when there is no reasonable dispute as to the 
existence of facts supporting an affirmative defense, the officer’s knowledge 
of such facts should affect probable cause. 
The use of an affirmative defense at trial and the inclusion of facts 
supporting an affirmative defense in probable cause analysis are not mutually 
exclusive and, in fact, utilize distinct analyses. In a criminal proceeding, facts 
supporting an affirmative defense are evaluated to resolve whether a crime 
had been committed;127 in a civil action for false arrest, such facts are 
evaluated to determine the reasonableness of the arrest.128 At the criminal 
trial, the fact finder considers all admissible facts in existence that support the 
affirmative defense; in probable cause analysis, only those facts available to 
the arresting officer are reviewed.129 In a criminal setting, the burden of 
proving the affirmative defense varies by defense and by jurisdiction,130 but at 
the scene of the arrest, it is always the burden of the officer to consider the 
totality of facts in resolving probable cause. Moreover, the determination of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the reasonableness of an arrest are 
independently resolvable. Consider this hypothetical: A citizen is found in 
possession of marijuana by a police officer.131 The citizen tells the officer he 
has a prescription but has no prescription card in his possession. Because the 
officer has no obligation to believe the suspect, and presumably no duty to 
investigate further, the officer likely has probable cause to proceed with the 
 
 126. See, e.g., Holman v. City of York, 564 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding it would be 
impractical to require the officer to “painstakingly . . . weigh possible defenses” on the scene of 
the arrest, “particularly given the rapidity with which the events transpired here”); State v. Decker, 
No. 73949-2-1, 2017 WL 1137220, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2017), review dismissed, State v. 
Decker, 403 P.3d 43 (Wash. 2017) (finding that the validity of an affirmative defense is a 
determination made by the court, not an arresting officer). 
 127. 115 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 309, Proof of Necessity Defense in a Criminal Case § 22 (2019). 
 128. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). 
 129. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); accord Smith v. Dowson, 158 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. 
Minn. 1994) (finding evidence relating to police investigation which occurred after the arrest 
was irrelevant in probable cause analysis). 
 130. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235–36 (1987) (discussing state law on burden shifting 
in proving self-defense; all but two states put the burden on the prosecution to prove the absence 
of self-defense once properly raised by the defendant). 
 131. In this hypothetical, the alleged crime is possession of marijuana and the affirmative 
defense is a medical marijuana prescription. But these facts could be easily interchanged with other 
possession-related crimes for which a statutory affirmative defense would remove criminal 
culpability, such as having a prescription for a controlled substance, or a license to possess a firearm. 
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arrest. Assume, however, the suspect had provided the prescription card to 
the officer. Should presentment of the license defeat probable cause? While 
one would assume that presentment of a license should keep someone from 
being hauled into jail, courts are split on whether production of a prescription 
card is sufficient to thwart probable cause to arrest.132 Moreover, it may be 
reasonable for the officer to discredit, and thus ignore, the presentment of 
the affirmative defense, if there is evidence the document is fake or otherwise 
fraudulent.133 
Now add the additional fact that the suspect had previously been arrested 
by this officer on the same charge, and in that case it was determined the 
suspect’s license was in fact valid. In this scenario, probable cause is likely 
lacking where a reasonable officer with that information would have known 
the defense was available and therefore no crime had been committed. The 
point made here is that the citizen, under all versions of the hypothetical, 
should be found not guilty if able to present at trial a valid license to possess. 
Such a finding, however, would not affect probable cause for the original 
arrest ex post, which, as illustrated here, is a separate and distinct inquiry. 
Only upon an independent finding that the officer was unreasonable in 
ignoring exculpatory facts available should a court find probable cause 
lacking. 
The Third Circuit addressed the issue in the context of criminal firearm 
possession where licensure was an affirmative defense to the crime.134 Failing 
to distinguish the use of an affirmative defense at trial with its role in probable 
cause analysis, the Third Circuit found the affirmative defense of licensure 
irrelevant to the determination of probable cause.135 Following Pennsylvania 
 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Fieck, 54 F. Supp. 3d 841, 843 (W.D. Mich. 2014) (stating that 
defendant’s medical marijuana card, allowing him to both grow and consume medical marijuana, 
did not negate probable cause for a search warrant); People v. Strasburg, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 306, 
311 (Ct. App. 2007) (“The fact that defendant had a medical marijuana prescription, and could 
lawfully possess an amount of marijuana greater than that Deputy Mosely initially found, does not 
detract from the officer’s probable cause.”). But see Allen v. Kumagai, 356 F. App’x 8, 9 (9th Cir. 
2009) (holding “the officers’ knowledge of his medical authorization may be relevant to whether 
they had probable cause to believe he had committed a crime”). 
 133. Permitting an officer to discount or believe to be fraudulent a written prescription or 
similar authorization document presented by a citizen pre-arrest is in line with the permitted, yet 
controversial practice of government agencies refusing to give full faith and credit to birth 
certificates presented for the purpose of obtaining a passport. See generally Sanchez v. Kerry, 648 
F. App’x 386 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (discussing doubt as to validity). In Sanchez, however, 
there were factors that created doubt as to the validity of the government issued passport (i.e., it was 
issued by a particular midwife who was known for issuing fraudulent birth certificates). Id. Thus, 
absent reason to doubt the authenticity of the document, officers should be compelled to take it at 
face value; otherwise, there would be no realized value in possessing and presenting the document. 
 134. United States v. Cooper, 293 F. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Bond, 
173 F. App’x 144, 146 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 135. See, e.g., Cooper, 293 F. App’x at 120 (finding that the affirmative defense of licensure is 
irrelevant); Bond, 173 F. App’x at 146 (citing Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 399 A.2d 392, 396 (Pa. 
1979)) (finding that the affirmative defense of licensure is irrelevant). 
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courts, who have interpreted the relevant criminal statute (which contains the 
affirmative defense of licensure) as not requiring the prosecution to prove at 
trial that the suspect did not have a license for the firearm, the Third Circuit 
concluded the arresting officer also need not consider licensure prior to 
making the arrest.136 In United States v. Bond, the court noted that “under 
Pennsylvania law, a police officer has probable cause to arrest an individual 
for violation of section 6108 based solely on the officer’s observation that the 
individual is in possession of a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia.”137 
Though an officer observing a citizen with a firearm may have reasonable 
suspicion sufficient to stop and question the individual to determine whether 
they had a license, to say the officer had probable cause to arrest the citizen 
is an extreme conclusion.138 Applying the probable cause standard used in 
Bond to other conduct prohibited without a license by statute exposes the 
unfeasibility of universal application. For instance, Pennsylvania Statute  
section 1501 expressly prohibits the driving of a “motor vehicle upon a 
highway or public property,”139 something several million Pennsylvanians do 
every day. Like section 6108 (firearm possession), section 1501 (operating a 
motor vehicle) includes the affirmative defense of licensure (i.e., a driver’s 
license).140 Applying the standard used in Bond, probable cause for an arrest 
for a violation of section 1501, i.e., driving a car, would materialize upon the 
mere observation by law enforcement of an individual driving a motor vehicle 
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania—an absurd result when viewed in this 
context.141 
 
 136. See, e.g., Cooper, 293 F. App’x at 117; Bond, 173 F. App’x at 146. 
 137. Bond, 173 F. App’x at 146 (citing Commonwealth v. Romero, 673 A.2d 374, 377 
(1996)). Later, in Cooper, the court appeared to retract slightly its position in Bond, finding 
observation of an individual of a firearm in a public place provided reasonable suspicion to detain 
the individual, as opposed to probable cause for the arrest. Cooper, 293 F. App’x at 119. In Cooper, 
the individual did not have a license. Id. 
 138. See generally United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 48 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“While a police decision that the time is right to arrest a suspect should properly be given great 
deference . . . the power to arrest is an awesome one and is subject to abuse.” (citation omitted)); 
BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding an officer has a duty “to make a 
thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment before invoking the awesome power of 
arrest and detention” (quoting Moore v. Marketplace Rest., Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1345–46 (7th 
Cir. 1985))). 
 139. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501 (2018). 
 140. Compare 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501 (“No person, except those expressly exempted, shall 
drive any motor vehicle upon a highway or public property in this Commonwealth unless the 
person has a driver’s license valid under the provisions of this chapter.”), with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 6108 (2018) (“No person shall carry a firearm, rifle or shotgun at any time upon the public 
streets or upon any public property in a city of the first class unless . . . such person is licensed to 
carry a firearm . . . .”). 
 141. Even assuming Cooper overruled Bond (which is unlikely due to the fact the Cooper 
opinion makes no mention of Bond) the standard set out in Cooper would still lead to ridiculous 
results if applied broadly, in that it would create reasonable suspicion sufficient to permit an 
officer to pull over any person he observed operating a vehicle on a public highway. 
A5_SULLIVAN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/20/2020  6:21 PM 
716 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:687 
Certain courts have found the argument persuasive that an affirmative 
defense is logically irrelevant in probable cause analysis because, to assert an 
affirmative defense, one must first admit having committed the crime, and an 
admission of having committed a crime conclusively establishes probable 
cause.142 This argument, however, ignores the procedural distinctions 
between a criminal trial (where the inquiry is the culpability of the 
defendant), and the later-in-time civil suit for false arrest (where the inquiry 
is the reasonableness of the seizure). Contrary to the view of some,143 the right 
to assert an affirmative defense to a criminal charge does not somehow make 
evidence of the defense irrelevant in probable cause analysis. Though an 
officer may not be burdened with the task of determining guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt at the scene of the arrest, the Fourth Amendment 
nonetheless requires a reasonable determination be made as to the 
probability of guilt. If the officer has evidence that the suspect is legally 
justified in his actions, this factor must play a role in assessing such probability. 
As noted in Thomas, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not permit police 
officers to arrest individuals whom they know have done nothing wrong, 
based solely on the formalistic distinction between ‘elements of a crime’ and 
‘affirmative defenses.’”144 
B. NO DUTY TO INVESTIGATE FURTHER ONCE PROBABLE  
CAUSE IS ESTABLISHED 
The law provides that once a law enforcement officer has an objectively 
reasonable belief that a crime has or is about to be committed, the officer has 
 
 142. See Beiles v. City of Chicago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 830, 836–37 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“There is no 
legal basis for allowing an affirmative defense, which might have allowed the plaintiff to escape a 
conviction . . . to interfere with the established . . . probable-cause-to-arrest analysis.” (quoting 
Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 1998))); Morrison v. Exec. Aircraft Refinishing, 
Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (“By its very definition, ‘[a]n affirmative 
defense is established only when a defendant admits the essential facts of a complaint and sets up 
other facts in justification or avoidance.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Will v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 544, 547 (S.D. Ga. 1986))); Corbett v. Goode, No. 87-7360, 1990 WL 
181499, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1990) (“Defendants persuasively argue that the availability of 
the affirmative defense in the statute is logically irrelevant to issue of whether probable cause to 
arrest existed: ‘The availability of an affirmative defense focuses on the ultimate analysis of guilt 
at trial, but has nothing to do with whether the threshold elements of the offense, or probable 
cause, existed at the time of arrest . . . [I]n order to assert the affirmative defense, plaintiff must first 
admit that she committed the crime of defiant trespass as charged. Logically, an admission that 
she committed the act charged also constitutes an admission that probable cause existed.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 15, 16)). 
 143. See, e.g., Humphrey, 148 F.3d at 724 (“Entrapment is not part of our Fourth Amendment 
probable-cause-to-arrest analysis. . . . [It] is an affirmative defense of a criminal defendant to 
otherwise culpable conduct.”). 
 144. Thomas v. City of Galveston, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 836 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 
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no duty to investigate further before arresting the suspect.145 It follows, then, 
that an officer would have no furthering obligation to investigate a suspect’s 
claims of innocence146 or mere assertion of an affirmative defense to the 
crime.147 Courts have held an officer’s failure to pursue potentially 
exculpatory leads will not in itself negate probable cause.148 As such, the law 
does not require the officer to “exhaust every potentially exculpatory lead or 
resolve every doubt about a suspect’s guilt before probable cause is 
established.”149 The query in a civil matter for false arrest is whether probable 
cause existed to reasonably believe a suspect engaged in criminal conduct; 
this reasonableness standard “does not require an officer to be certain that 
subsequent prosecution of the arrestee will be successful.”150 As noted by the 
Supreme Court, “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty 
will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action for every 
defendant acquitted—indeed, for every suspect released.”151 Without 
diminishing these basic tenets, some courts have imposed on an officer a duty 
to conduct some minimal investigation when principles of reasonableness 
require it. In Romero v. Fay, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged police need not 
interview alleged alibi witnesses, but found the officers had a duty “to 
 
 145. See, e.g., Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Once probable cause is 
established, an officer is under no duty to investigate further or to look for additional evidence which 
may exculpate the accused.”); Schertz v. Waupaca Cty., 875 F.2d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t 
appears that once police officers have discovered sufficient facts to establish probable cause, they 
have no constitutional obligation to conduct any further investigation in the hopes of uncovering 
potentially exculpatory evidence.” (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145–46 (1979))). 
 146. Baker, 443 U.S. at 145–46 (“Given the requirements that arrest be made only on probable 
cause and that one detained be accorded a speedy trial, we do not think a sheriff executing an arrest 
warrant is required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence  
. . . .”); accord Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 744 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Panetta 
v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395–96 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A]n officer’s failure to investigate an arrestee’s 
protestations of innocence generally does not vitiate probable cause.”). 
 147. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 145–46 (holding that an officer has no duty to investigate the 
validity of any defense prior to effecting an arrest); see also Frodge v. City of Newport, 501 F. App’x 
519, 527 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen a suspect asserts an affirmative defense, this does not 
automatically vitiate probable cause. The officer is not required to accept the explanation without 
question . . . .”); Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 148. See, e.g., Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Although an officer 
may not disregard readily available exculpatory evidence of which he is aware, the failure to 
pursue a potentially exculpatory lead is not sufficient to negate probable cause.” (citations 
omitted)); Jean v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-00157, 2009 WL 3459469, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 
22, 2009) (“Simply asking a few more questions to get a more complete picture might have even 
saved Jean from the burden of undergoing stressful and time-consuming prosecution. Hindsight, 
of course, is 20–20. But the law does not require hindsight, let alone a perfect investigation prior 
to establishing probable cause to arrest.”); Black v. District of Columbia, 466 F. Supp. 2d 177, 
180 (D.D.C. 2006) (“[F]ailure to investigate a suspect’s alibi does not belie probable cause.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 149. Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). 
 150. Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 371 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 151. Baker, 443 U.S. at 145. 
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reasonably interview witnesses readily available at the scene, investigate basic 
evidence, or otherwise inquire if a crime has been committed at all before 
invoking the power of warrantless arrest and detention.”152 Similarly, in 
Sevigny v. Dicksey, the Fourth Circuit found probable cause lacking where the 
officer unreasonably failed to interview witnesses at the scene of an 
automobile accident who would have verified the arrestee’s version of the 
facts.153 There, the court emphasized the officer’s failure to “avail himself of 
readily available information that would have clarified matters to the point 
that one of the offenses would have been flatly ruled out as factually 
unsupportable.”154 In Bigford v. Taylor, the Fifth Circuit concluded the facts 
available to the officer were insufficient to establish probable cause where 
“[m]inimal further investigation . . . would have reduced any suspicion 
created by the facts the police had discovered.”155 In each case, the courts 
supported the idea that officers must conduct some investigation when 
reasonableness requires it. 
A cognizable argument can be made that probable cause analysis 
requires not only an inquiry into the totality of facts available to the officer at 
the moment of arrest, but also the reasonableness of the investigation 
performed.156 Much uncertainty lies in the interpretation of the phrase 
“readily available” used by many courts in discussing the totality of the 
information available to the officer—whether it encompasses only facts 
actually known to the officer at the moment of arrest, or also includes those 
additional potentially exculpatory facts which could be obtained with minimal 
effort or investigation. Whether an officer has a duty to conduct a minimal 
investigation into potentially exculpatory facts is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but it would seem that a rule requiring at least some minimal 
investigation in non-exigent circumstances would appeal to the notion of 
reasonableness. 
For jurisdictions that already require a minimal investigation into 
potentially exculpatory evidence prior to making an arrest, imposing the True 
Totality Rule would add little to any burden on law enforcement. Even in 
jurisdictions that hold that no investigation is necessary in resolving probable 
cause, such a view would not be offended by the True Totality Rule, as the 
Rule would only require consideration of the officer’s present knowledge of facts 
supporting an affirmative defense. Such knowledge is within the totality of 
facts and circumstances which must be considered in determining 
 
 152. Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476–77, 1477 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 153. Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 956–58 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 154. Id. at 957. 
 155. Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1219 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 
646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 156. See Barfield v. Louisiana ex rel. La. Dep’t of Justice, 325 F. App’x 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(“[A]n officer must have probable cause to make an arrest based on an investigation that was 
reasonable under the circumstances.”). 
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reasonableness for the seizure, especially where such seizure is deemed lawful 
only upon an objectively reasonable conclusion “that the suspect had 
committed or was committing an offense.”157 As noted by the court in Thomas, 
“[t]his is in line with the distinction . . . between considering facts actually 
known by the officer (which officers must do) and investigating all potential 
defenses (which they need not to do).”158 
C. OFFICER MOTIVES ARE IRRELEVANT IN PROBABLE CAUSE ANALYSIS 
In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded matter-of-factly 
that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis.”159 These facts alleged to be known to the officers 
establish Mr. Thomas’ right to defend his property, and, thus, if found to be 
true, should negate probable cause.160 Thomas illustrates the distinction 
between an officer’s motive (subjective) and his awareness of certain facts 
relating to such motive (which may be objectively evaluated). 
Moreover, a distinction should be noted between the arguably legitimate 
ulterior motives of law enforcement exemplified in Whren and cases cited 
therein, and the self-serving unlawful motives present in cases such as Thomas 
and Jocks. For instance, in Whren, the ulterior motive was to gather evidence 
to secure an arrest for the commission of an actual crime. Conversely, in 
Thomas and Jocks, the officers’ alleged motive for the arrest was to cover up 
their own unlawful conduct. In Whren, an articulated distinction could be 
made between the officer’s subjective motive and the objectively reasonable 
basis for seizure; this is not the case in Thomas and Jocks, where the officers’ 
subjective motive for the arrest and objective reasonableness are inseparable, 
and therefore must be analyzed as such. 
VI. VIABILITY OF THE RULE AND ISSUES WITH IMPLEMENTATION 
Adoption of the True Totality Rule will require significant flexibility by 
the courts, education and training of law enforcement, and monitoring. First, 
courts will need to grapple with whether the rule would apply to pending 
cases, or only to matters arising after the adoption of the rule, for purposes of 
 
 157. See, e.g., United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing United States 
v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
 158. Thomas v. City of Galveston, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 836 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 
 159. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also Scott v. United States, 436 
U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (agreeing that “[s]ubjective intent alone . . . does not make otherwise lawful 
conduct illegal or unconstitutional”); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (holding 
that an officer may search a suspect’s person incident to a custodial arrest, even without a 
subjective fear of the suspect); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973) (finding 
a traffic-violation arrest to be lawful, even if it were a pretext for a drug search). 
 160. Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (“‘[I]n assessing probable cause to effect an arrest,’ [the 
officers] could not ‘ignore information known to [the]m which proves that the suspect is 
protected by an affirmative legal justification for his suspected criminal actions.’” (first and third 
alterations in the original) (quoting Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 571 (6th Cir. 1999))). 
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the clearly established prong of qualified immunity. To overcome current 
obstacles of the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity defense, 
courts must find that existing clearly established rules of law already 
encompass the True Totality Rule, must analyze the clearly established prong 
of qualified immunity only after analyzing and ruling preliminarily on 
probable cause with consideration of facts supporting an available affirmative 
defense, and must be wary of analyzing the issue arguendo. Additionally, police 
departments will need to retrain their officers; while this Article posits that 
officers have always had the duty to incorporate both inculpatory and 
exculpatory facts into the analysis, most officers have not been trained on the 
role of an affirmative defense in evaluating probable cause. Finally, the rule 
must be monitored to ensure its application does not result in excessive 
liability against law enforcement; the primary purpose of the rule is to reduce 
the frequency in which innocent citizens are arrested, not to increase the 
frequency of false arrest claims. 
A. OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME IN LIGHT OF THE “CLEARLY ESTABLISHED”  
PRONG OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE 
Immediate adoption of the rule proposed by this Article may nonetheless 
leave some plaintiffs without a remedy, as the government actor could argue 
the rule had not yet been established at the time of their alleged conduct. As 
previously discussed, a government official may be immune from liability even 
for proven violations of a citizen’s constitutional right if the conduct alleged 
was objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time the 
challenged conduct occurred.161 Thus, even if it was determined that a 
particular arrest was unlawful, liability would be avoided unless the law 
relevant to the particular incident was “so clearly established that no 
reasonable officer, faced with the situation before [the defendant], could 
have believed that probable cause to arrest existed.”162 
The Supreme Court has never given a wholly convincing definition of 
what it means for a right to be “clearly established,”163 but in view of its 
cumulative precedent spanning the last three decades, and particularly in its 
recent holding in District of Columbia v. Wesby, it appears the Court is willing to 
find liability only where there is an established law highly specific to the issue 
in question, and which has been applied to facts similar to the case at hand.164 
The Court in Wesby not only reiterated its previously expressed view that “[t]he 
 
 161. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818–19 (1982)). 
 162. Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Anderson, 
483 U.S. at 640 (“The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”). 
 163. John C. Williams, Note, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1298 
–99 (2012). 
 164. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018). 
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rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is ‘clear to a reasonable officer 
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted[,]’”165 but 
reemphasized the need to utilize “a high ‘degree of specificity’” in 
determining whether the rule, law, or right in question was clearly 
established.166 In Wesby, officers arrested several individuals for trespass 
despite their claims that they believed they had permission to be there 
(arguably, an affirmative defense, though the court referred to it as an 
“innocent explanation”).167 The Court determined that there was no “robust” 
precedent requiring an officer to accept the individuals’ “bona fide belief” 
that they had permission to be on the property, and to the contrary, there 
existed precedent indicating the officers had no such duty; as a result, the 
Court found the officers could not have been found to have violated a law so 
clearly established that all officers would know of it.168 Rather than analyzing 
the relevance of the evidence tending to dissipate probable cause, the Court 
instead concluded the plaintiffs failed to establish the “clearly established 
prong” necessary to overcome the defense of qualified immunity.169 This 
ruling signals the reality that even if the Court were to encounter the 
affirmative defense-probable cause issue, it would likely refuse to decide the 
question and instead determine that, because it had not yet decided the 
question, it was not clearly established. Thus the officers, and arguably all 
future officers into perpetuity, would be entitled to qualified immunity. 
While the court in Thomas was willing to dissipate qualified immunity 
upon finding to be clearly established the general rule that a citizen has a 
right to be free from an unreasonable seizure, had that been appealed, the 
current Supreme Court would likely have found such a finding violative of its 
maxim “that courts must not ‘define clearly established law at a high level of 
generality . . . .’”170 Notable is another recent ruling in White v. Pauly, where 
the Court opined a law is not “clearly established” with sufficient specificity 
unless the § 1983 plaintiff can “identify a case where an officer acting  
 
 165. Id. at 590 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). 
 166. Id. (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015) (per curiam)). The degree 
of specificity was further refined in Kisela v. Hughes, where the Court found that the law was not 
sufficiently clear in the Ninth Circuit on question of whether it was reasonable for an officer to 
shoot a woman standing in her driveway with a kitchen knife who, as the facts were described by 
Justice Sotomayor in her dissent, “posed no objective threat of harm to officers or others, had 
committed no crime, and appeared calm and collected during the police encounter.” Kisela v. 
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1158 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (per curiam). Although the 
Ninth Circuit had previously denied qualified immunity to an officer under similar circumstances 
(the suspect had a crossbow, as opposed to a knife), the Court went out of its way to distinguish 
that case from the one before it and, as a result, appeared to shift the definition of “similar” to 
mean something closer to “identical.” Id. at 1159, 1161. 
 167. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. 
 168. Id. at 591–93. 
 169. Id. at 593. 
 170. Id. at 590 (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014)). 
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under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated the Fourth 
Amendment.”171 
The rulings in Wesby, White and others illustrate the Court’s apparent 
disconnect from the origins and intent of the Fourth Amendment, and 
further demonstrate how qualified immunity has slowly morphed into 
absolute immunity, or frighteningly close to it. In an effort to protect 
government actors from liability, the specificity now required for a law to be 
clearly established swings the scales so far in favor of the government that it 
has become nearly impossible for plaintiffs to overcome qualified immunity. 
Not only did the Court in Wesby amplify its prior specificity requirement on 
the clearly established prong, it reiterated that courts should avoid resolving 
the constitutional claim when the matter can be disposed of pre-trial upon a 
finding of qualified immunity.172 
The Doctrine of Qualified Immunity was created by the Court, not by 
Congress, and many scholars opine that the Doctrine directly contradicts the 
intent of Congress in enacting § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.173 
Congress could take action to effectively eliminate or modify the Doctrine as 
necessary to ensure access to relief to those harmed by unconstitutional acts 
of government officials.174 
1. Clearly Established General Constitutional Rules Already  
Encompass the True Totality Rule 
Even if the True Totality Rule is not by itself clearly established in a 
particular jurisdiction, clearly established general statements of the law may 
be capable of giving the government actor fair and clear warning. While the 
Supreme Court in recent cases has discouraged defining clearly established 
law at a high level of generality,175 it has in the past found that “a general 
 
 171. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017). 
 172. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589 n.7 (“We continue to stress that lower courts ‘should think hard, 
and then think hard again,’ before addressing both qualified immunity and the merits of an 
underlying constitutional claim.” (quoting Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 707 (2011))). 
 173. See Caryn J. Ackerman, Comment, Fairness or Fiction: Striking a Balance Between the Goals of 
§ 1983 and the Policy Concerns Motivating Qualified Immunity, 85 OR. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2006) 
(“[I]f left unfettered, the doctrine persistently threatens the promise of 42 U.S.C. § 1983—that 
all persons have a remedy by law when public officials deprive them of rights secured by the 
Constitution and laws of this country.”); Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1802–03 (2018) (describing how the modern doctrine exceeds 
the liability defenses contemplated at the time the law was enacted). 
 174. See Jon O. Newman, Opinion, Here’s a Better Way to Punish the Police: Sue Them for Money, 
WASH. POST (June 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/heres-a-better-way-to-
punish-the-police-sue-them-for-money/2016/06/23/c0608ad4-3959-11e6-9ccd-d6005beac8b3 
story.html [https://perma.cc/R8LK-GFMU] (arguing that “the defense of qualified immunity 
should be abolished” by Congress). But see generally Scott Michelman, The Branch Best Qualified to 
Abolish Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999 (2018) (proposing a good case for why the judicial 
branch is best suited to course correct the Doctrine that has lost its way). 
 175. See, e.g., Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590. 
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constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with 
obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though ‘the very 
action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.’”176 
The Court’s earlier views on this issue, that “a general constitutional rule 
already identified in the decisional law” could satisfy the fair warning 
requirement,177 provide a more balanced approach in analyzing the 
availability of qualified immunity. In Thomas, the defendant officers 
contended that because the Fifth Circuit had not previously ruled that 
probable cause analysis included the officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s 
affirmative defense, the concept was not clearly established for purposes of 
qualified immunity.178 In support, the defendants relied on Sorenson v. Ferrie 
wherein the court held if the legal standard is novel, unknown or ambiguous, 
then prevailing law may not be clearly established.179 The court in Thomas, 
however, flatly rejected any assertion the concept was novel or unknown, 
finding that both the constitutional “right to be free from arrest without 
probable cause,”180 and that probable cause determination requires 
examination of “the ‘totality of facts and circumstances within a police 
officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest[,]’” including those 
demonstrating an available affirmative defense,181 were clearly established. 
Although the Fifth Circuit had yet to expressly rule on the specific issue, and 
in fact had declined to do so on two prior occasions,182 the court in Thomas 
found the general proposition was clearly established.183 
Arriving at the opposite conclusion, however, the district court in Sanchez 
v. Labate granted qualified immunity despite allegations the officers were 
aware of evidence the suspect was acting in self-defense.184 The court in 
 
 176. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). However, “when an earlier case expressly 
leaves open whether a general rule applies to the particular type of conduct at issue, a very high 
degree of prior factual particularity may be necessary” in order for the rule of law to be clearly 
established. Id. at 271. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim at 21, Thomas v. City of 
Galveston, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (No. 4:10-cv-3331), 2011 WL 13322923. 
 179. Sorenson v. Ferrie, 134 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 180. Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (quoting Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th 
Cir. 1994)); Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 181. Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 836 (quoting United States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th 
Cir. 1995)). 
 182. See United States v. Craig, 381 F. App’x 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2010); Piazza v. Mayne, 217 
F.3d 239, 246–47 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 183. Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 837; accord Williams v. Sirmons, 307 F. App’x 354, 358–59 
(11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “[t]he law has been clearly established since at least the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Carroll v. United States . . . that probable cause determinations involve 
an examination of all facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge at the time of an arrest.” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Dietrich, 167 F.3d at 1012)). 
 184. Sanchez v. Labate, 564 F. App’x 371, 372–74 (10th Cir. 2014). 
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Sanchez concluded that, at the time of the arrest, it “was not clearly 
established” that an officer must give any credence to an affirmative defense 
where the elements of the crime are otherwise established.185 The court found 
unconvincing the plaintiff’s assertion that holdings in other circuits clearly 
establish the requirement; the court found only Supreme Court or Tenth 
Circuit decisions specifically to this point could make the law “clearly 
established” for purposes of qualified immunity.186 Adding blur to the haze is 
this question of whether the clarity of a relevant rule of law should be viewed 
with such jurisdictional restrictions.187 That is, whether courts should look to 
other jurisdictions in determining the “established” factor of the test.188 
If a particular jurisdiction had yet to rule on the issue, an argument could 
be made that no reasonable officer in that jurisdiction could have known that 
the affirmative defense must be considered. But what if the jurisdiction had 
not yet addressed the issue, but the majority of other circuits had found 
affirmative defenses must be considered? Or, what if the rule had been 
adopted in a particular jurisdiction, but there was an intra-circuit split on 
whether evidence of the defense must be observed first-hand? Also, even if a 
jurisdiction had ruled on the issue, if the ruling pertained only to a particular 
affirmative defense, such as self-defense, a subsequent officer who failed to 
 
 185. Id. at 372–74 (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
Because the court analyzed the effect of the affirmative defense on probable cause despite finding 
the law “not clearly established,” it remains unclear whether the court’s ruling was that probable 
cause was not negated by the affirmative defense (because either “evidence of self-defense . . . was 
[not] conclusively established” or because New Mexico law does not require evidence of an 
affirmative defense to be presented to a grand jury in determining probable cause for an 
indictment), or whether the officer was entitled qualified immunity despite probable cause having 
been negated (because the concept “was not clearly established”); or both. Id. at 374. The court’s 
analysis here presents a prime example of how courts intermingle and even merge the inquiries, 
furthering confusion in a realm that is already frightfully confusing, even among scholars. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 955 (2015) (noting that “[d]espite some Supreme Court guidance on 
what law counts in the clearly-established-law analysis, the question of what law controls is itself 
still amazingly unclear”). 
 188. Though a majority of courts will consider cases from other jurisdictions when 
determining whether a particular law is “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity, 
others have ruled only binding precedent shall govern. See id. at 955 n.287 (listing cases 
exemplifying the willingness of the majority of circuit courts to consider rulings from other 
circuits). Compare Dietrich, 167 F.3d at 1012 (“When determining whether a right is ‘clearly 
established,’ we look ‘first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to decisions of this Court and 
other courts within our circuit, and finally to decisions of other circuits.’” (quoting Daugherty v. 
Campbell, 935 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1991))), with Sanchez, 564 F. App’x at 372–73 (finding 
the law “not clearly established” without a ruling by the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit). In 
whole, there appears to be no consistency in this regard. Some courts, like in Sanchez, have found 
that only decisions of the Supreme Court and those within its circuit can be deemed “clearly 
established,” while other courts, such as the Thomas court, may consider what the plurality or 
majority has found, and yet others, like the court in Dietrich, incorporate a hierarchical approach 
that may or may not include consideration of rulings from other jurisdictions. 
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consider evidence of a different type of affirmative defense, such as necessity, 
would arguably be without notice of any obligation to consider that defense.189 
While the ruling in Sanchez correctly states that the specific issue before 
it had not yet been ruled on in the jurisdiction, such a narrow view, like that 
of the sitting Supreme Court, ignores the clearly established general 
principles recognized by the court in Thomas. The Thomas interpretation 
better aligns with the underlying objectives of the Fourth Amendment and  
§ 1983, as it ensures a remedy for those victimized by false arrest when law 
enforcement violates clearly established rights set out in the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, until courts analyze and rule on probable cause in the manner 
proposed by this Article, citizens will continue to be without a remedy. 
2. Analyze Probable Cause First, then Qualified Immunity 
As discussed previously, the Supreme Court often emphasizes how courts 
should avoid addressing the merits of the case when the matter can be 
resolved on qualified immunity grounds.190 The reasoning often lies in the 
promotion of judicial efficiency, as well as the concept that qualified 
immunity is a defense from suit, and thus law enforcement should be spared 
from trial. However, if such matters never reach evaluation of the merits, the 
law can never be clearly established, and extreme constitutional violations will 
continue undeterred and without recourse.191 In scenarios where the facts 
establish a probable cause-negating affirmative defense, courts should analyze 
probable cause in light of the affirmative defense before summarily granting 
qualified immunity. The trial court in Lischner v. Upper Darby Township, 
described the need and value to first consider whether the affirmative defense 
would negate probable cause.192 
In the context of the particular affirmative defense present in Lischner, 
the court expressed its concern that: 
 
 189. For instance, the Third Circuit has found that evidence of affirmative defenses 
specifically included in the statute setting forth elements of the crime is relevant in evaluating 
probable cause; however, the Third Circuit has found that defenses found elsewhere in the law, 
such as necessity and statute of limitations, need not be considered by an officer. Holman v. City 
of York, 564 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1396 (3d 
Cir. 1989)). 
 190. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018); see also James E. Pfander, 
Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1603–06 (2011) (providing a concise overview of what he refers to as the 
“order of battle” as it evolved from the mandatory constitutional analysis coming out of Saucier to 
the discretionary model that arose from Pearson and remains today the law of the land). 
 191. See Blum, supra note 187, at 925–40 (providing a particularized analysis of rulings 
exemplifying the deleterious consequence of failing to address the merits of the underlying 
constitutional claim). 
 192. Lischner v. Upper Darby Twp., No. 05-4546, 2007 WL 433170, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 
5, 2007). 
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[I]f courts never reach the question of whether [the affirmative 
defense is present] in the context of reviewing probable cause, the 
law will never achieve any greater clarity, and the affirmative 
defense—which negates the criminality or wrongfulness of the act 
—will in most cases protect only against conviction, not against the 
potential inconvenience and stigma of arrest.193 
The court in Lischner emphasized the need to clarify the law so that 
officers can more easily ascertain, prior to arrest, whether the conduct 
observed is protected by an affirmative defense; the court reasoned such 
clarity is necessary to give effect to the right to freedom of expression without 
risk of arrest and detention. This highlights the major concern regarding the 
“clearly established” hurdle: If courts routinely grant qualified immunity on 
failure of the “clearly established” prong, thus avoiding determination on the 
merits, establishment of a constitutional violation on those particular facts can 
never be had; thus, if the exact scenario occurs again, even if it involved the 
same parties, the defendant police officers arguably could re-assert qualified 
immunity on the same grounds previously asserted because the constitutional 
violation was not analyzed and ruled on (and therefore not “established”) in 
the prior case. As eloquently stated by Judge Willett in a concurring opinion: 
Section 1983 meets Catch-22. Plaintiffs must produce precedent 
even as fewer courts are producing precedent. Important 
constitutional questions go unanswered precisely because those 
questions are yet unanswered. Courts then rely on that judicial 
silence to conclude there’s no equivalent case on the books. No 
precedent = no clearly established law = no liability. An Escherian 
Stairwell. Heads defendants win, tails plaintiffs lose. . . . The current 
“yes harm, no foul” imbalance leaves victims violated but not 
vindicated; wrongs are not righted, wrongdoers are not reproached, 
and those wronged are not redressed.194 
In order for future plaintiffs to demonstrate the rule proposed by this 
Article was clearly established at the time of the arrest, courts must, before 
ruling on qualified immunity, analyze and issue a ruling on probable cause, 
with such analysis incorporating evidence of the available affirmative defense 
among the totality of facts considered. If courts continually bypass the analysis 
in matters involving an affirmative defense, and instead resolve the matter 
 
 193. Id. at *11 (footnote omitted); see also Jonathan M. Freiman, The Problem of Qualified 
Immunity: How Conflating Microeconomics and Law Subverts the Constitution, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 61, 
 87–88 (1997) (“Though a plaintiff’s suit successfully overcoming a defendant’s claim of 
qualified immunity would generate precedent, under Anderson a plaintiff cannot overcome 
qualified immunity unless the law was clear at the time of the alleged incident, that is, unless the 
decision would add nothing to useful precedent.”). 
 194. Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 499 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring), 
withdrawn, 928 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2019). 
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solely on a finding that incorporation of an affirmative defense was not yet 
clearly established, citizens will continue to suffer violations of their rights 
without a remedy. Minor sacrifices in judicial efficiency are justified when 
necessary to ensure fundamental rights remain secure. Of course, courts 
analyzing probable cause in the way proposed here must also avoid the 
tendencies and pitfalls of analyzing arguendo. 
3. The Harm of Arguendo 
Compounding the confusion on the “clearly established” issue are courts 
that hold affirmative defenses are irrelevant, then analyze, arguendo or in 
dicta, whether the evidence of the affirmative defense would have been 
sufficient to negate probable cause if such evidence were relevant; in these 
instances, the courts always conclude the evidence was not sufficient.195 In 
many of these arguendo-rulings, courts declare that the affirmative defense is 
irrelevant, but the analysis reveals the true finding is that the facts of the 
affirmative defense in the particular case were insufficient to negate probable 
cause. It is quite clear from these rulings that had the facts been sufficient to 
negate probable cause, the court may have expressed a contrary rule at outset 
of its analysis: that facts of an affirmative defense are relevant. Establishing 
legal principles based on factual conclusions is dangerous, and likely to 
impact future cases in a way not intended by these courts. The potential 
consequence is that a court in a subsequent case faced with facts of an 
affirmative defense that are sufficient to negate probable cause would 
disregard them in light of earlier precedent broadly deeming them irrelevant 
regardless.196 
Courts analyzing in arguendo also exhibit an apparent propensity to 
afford greater weight to facts supporting their conclusion (i.e., that the 
affirmative defense is irrelevant), and disregard entirely facts that challenge 
it, resulting in precedent that is inherently fact-biased. It is also not clear from 
decisions that include arguendo analysis whether the review and conclusion 
are merely superlative dicta or part of its holding, and regardless, whether it 
makes the law any more clear for purposes of qualified immunity.197 
 
 195. See, e.g., United States v. Marin, 138 F. App’x 945, 946 (9th Cir. 2005); Radich v. Goode, 
886 F.2d 1391, 1396–97 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 196. Even if the court chose not to disregard the facts in the later case despite the earlier 
ruling, the defendant officer could successfully assert qualified immunity on the grounds that the 
earlier ruling deemed affirmative defenses irrelevant, and therefore the officer was not 
unreasonable in ignoring the facts supporting the affirmative defense. 
 197. If merely dicta, then it offers little to no advancement in the law, particularly as to 
whether the law was clearly established. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 365 (2000) (“[T]he 
phrase ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by [this] Court’ refers to the holdings, as 
opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” 
(second alteration in original)); Hamilton v. Cannon, 80 F.3d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The 
law cannot be established by dicta. Dicta is particularly unhelpful in qualified immunity cases 
where we seek to identify clearly established law.”). But see Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 496 
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The unfortunate consequence of ruling in this manner is the potential 
to leave a future plaintiff without a remedy: Even when the facts available are 
sufficient to negate probable cause, the officer could claim immunity by 
pointing to the prior case that held, in its arguendo hypothetical analysis, that 
the affirmative defense was irrelevant to the probable cause determination. 
To ensure citizens retain a remedy for an arrest that is determined 
unreasonable in light of the totality of facts and circumstances, courts should 
analyze the sufficiency of the affirmative defense as part of the core analysis, 
not in arguendo.198 
In view of the vast array of conflicting rulings nationally as to whether and 
when an affirmative defense is relevant in probable cause determinations, 
what amounts to a constitutional violation is anything but concrete and fails 
to establish a law that is predictable or clear for anyone. Additional confusion 
has come from courts picking and choosing, seemingly arbitrarily, which 
exculpatory facts or which affirmative defenses bear on probable cause, as well 
as courts that find the evidence irrelevant then analyze it anyway. A nationally 
propounded standard that recognizes the general constitutional principles 
acknowledged by the court in Thomas would limit judicial variance on the 
issue and may clearly establish the law to a level sufficient to give an officer 
“fair notice” when her conduct was unconstitutional. Unfortunately, this is 
highly unlikely to occur any time soon given the recent action of the Court to 
further strengthen and expand the qualified immunity doctrine and to 
heighten the burdens to establish a law as “clearly established.” Short of a 
significant and unexpected shift in the views of certain Justices, Congressional 
 
(7th Cir. 2009) (“When a court holds that certain conduct violates a constitutional right but that 
the right was not clearly established, the constitutional ruling is arguably dicta . . . but it still may 
clearly establish the law for future conduct.” (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–38 
(2009))); Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, J., 
concurring) (“[L]ucid and unambiguous dicta concerning the existence of a constitutional right 
can without more make that right ‘clearly established’ for purposes of a qualified immunity 
analysis.” (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998))); see also Aaron 
Belzer, Comment, The Audacity of Ignoring Hope: How the Existing Qualified Immunity Analysis Leads 
to Unremedied Rights, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 647, 649–50 (2012) (discussing how even where a court 
finds certain governmental conduct in violation of a constitutional right, if the court in the same 
breath excuses the conduct as objectively reasonable, a later court could find its conclusion 
pertaining to the constitutional violation mere dicta). 
 198. In lieu of analyzing the matter arguendo, the court could instead exercise its discretion 
to first analyze the constitutional claim and issue a ruling in this regard. Even if the court 
ultimately determines the law was not clearly established and for that reason the officers are 
entitled to qualified immunity, a ruling on the constitutionality of the acts alleged may help clarify 
the law in this area. This not only benefits future plaintiffs but educates law enforcement on the 
constitutionality of certain conduct. Of course, as discussed above, in ruling on the constitutional 
issue, courts must view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff rather than choosing 
the facts that align with a preconceived legal conclusion. Courts must also ensure the ruling on 
the constitutional issue is not perceived as merely dicta. See Blum, supra note 187, at 925–43. 
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action may ultimately be necessary to overcome the “clearly established” 
hurdle.199 
B. BURDEN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
The purpose of the proposed rule is not to impose more burden or 
liability on police officers, or to create additional causes of action for false 
arrest—the purpose of the rule is to reduce false arrests and to ensure citizens 
have a remedy when they are falsely arrested. Application of the proposed 
rule would impose civil liability only if it was found that the arresting officer 
unreasonably disregarded facts that would have established a complete 
defense to the crime. Courts and law enforcement defendants often take the 
position that consideration of an available affirmative defense would be over 
burdensome on officers who are often forced to make split-second decisions 
at the scene of an alleged crime.200 There is no dispute that in some situations 
the inclusion of this additional factor will add to an already challenging, 
complex analysis. However, the current analysis already requires a review of 
the totality of facts and circumstances—the rule merely confirms that 
evidence of an affirmative defense is among the totality that must be 
evaluated. The rule does not extend a requirement that the officer investigate 
and rule out every possible affirmative defense, or that the officer give 
credence to mere claims of innocence. The officer need only consider the 
facts and circumstances before her. The rule would also not require an officer 
to know and understand every possible affirmative defense that the suspect 
could assert at trial; the officer need only contemplate the affirmative 
defenses of which a reasonable, prudent officer would be aware.201 For 
 
 199. Professor James E. Pfander, in his article, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: 
Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, offers an intriguing alternative to relying on the 
Supreme Court or Congress to resolve the issue. Pfander, supra note 190, at 1606–11. In the 
Article, Professor Pfander posits, “[section] 1983 and Bivens litigants should be entitled to obtain 
an immunity-free determination of their constitutional claims by initiating a suit for nominal 
damages against the responsible officer.” Id. at 1607. He asserts, “[b]y removing the threat of 
personal liability, and with it much of the justification for qualified immunity, the suit for nominal 
damages would allow the plaintiff to secure a constitutional decision even where the law was not 
clearly established.” Id. at 1607–08. While the absence of compensatory damages may result in 
limited “immunity-free” cases brought, even a few a year could have a significant impact on the 
development of constitutional law involving circumstances where extreme constitutional 
violations too often go unpunished. See id. at 1608. 
 200. See, e.g., Holman v. City of York, 564 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2009). Holman was 
protesting outside an abortion clinic when, as he alleges, he was forced to step onto private 
property in order to avoid being struck by an on-coming car. He was subsequently arrested for 
trespass. The court found irrelevant his claim that the officer should have known his otherwise 
unlawful conduct was justified by necessity. The court reasoned that “[r]equiring [an officer]  
. . . painstakingly to weigh possible defenses, would be impractical, particularly given the rapidity 
with which the events transpired here.” Id. at 231. 
 201. Arguably, however, an officer should be obligated to have knowledge of all possible 
affirmative defenses available under the law. If ignorance of the law is not available to citizens as 
a defense to criminal culpability, perhaps it should not be available to police officers as a defense 
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instance, in Sands v. McCormick,202 the court appropriately concluded the 
officer had probable cause to arrest the suspect despite some available 
evidence that the statute of limitations had run on the crime charged (an 
affirmative defense). In this instance, the court ultimately ruled that the 
affirmative defense was irrelevant, but on the issue of officer liability, it could 
have come to the same conclusion by ruling the defense relevant and the facts 
insufficient. Here, due to the complexities of this particular affirmative 
defense, no reasonable officer could have had sufficient facts to know the 
defense would be available at the time of the arrest. Conversely, defenses such 
as self-defense, defense of property, and necessity could be established with 
facts typically available to an arresting officer. 
Moreover, contrary to the fears expressed by courts and law enforcement, 
the rule would not require officers to perform the same level of analysis 
required by judges and juries at trial on the criminal charge. At trial on a 
criminal charge, the fact finder views all the evidence, and determines, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, whether the suspect was guilty of the crime charged. In pre-
arrest probable cause analysis, however, the arresting officer need only 
consider the evidence available at the time of the arrest, and determine, within a 
reasonable degree of probability, whether the suspect was guilty of a crime.203 
Though the standard of proof for probable cause is substantially less than 
what is necessary to convict, the basic inquiry remains the same: Did the 
suspect commit a crime?204 If the officer is aware of facts of an affirmative 
defense that would lead a reasonable officer to believe the answer to that 
query is no, then it would be unreasonable to subject the citizen to a 
fundamental right-depriving arrest and the collateral consequences that 
follow. Importantly, the rule would permit officers to make reasonable 
mistakes, while discouraging officers from arresting a citizen who they have 
reason to believe had committed no crime. Because the rule would not 
require an officer to conduct any additional analysis beyond the totality of the 
circumstances test, and in fact would relieve the officer of the burden of 
discerning what type of evidence can be evaluated, the additional 
encumbrance, if any, would be negligible. 
 
to civil liability; that is, if a citizen is deemed to have knowledge of the entire criminal code and 
all available affirmative defenses, so too should a reasonable, prudent officer vested with the 
power of enforcing these laws. 
 202. See Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 265 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 203. See Mazuka v. Rice Twp. Police Dep’t, 655 F. App’x 892, 896 (3d Cir. 2016) (Smith, J., 
concurring) (“As its name implies, probable cause ‘require[s] a belief of guilt that is reasonable, 
as opposed to certain.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 
595, 601–02 (3d Cir. 2005))). 
 204. See supra Section IV.C. 
A5_SULLIVAN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/20/2020  6:21 PM 
2020] REVITALIZING FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 731 
C. POTENTIAL IMPACT ON § 1983 ACTIONS FOR FALSE ARREST 
Adoption of the rule proposed by this Article is likely to result in an 
increase in meritorious § 1983 claims for false arrest. Presumably, all matters 
that would have been summarily dismissed upon a finding that the officer had 
no duty to consider the affirmative defense before making the arrest or that 
such duty was not clearly established, would now proceed to trial.205 With 
knowledge of the new rule, civil rights attorneys may be more inclined to 
accept cases that include evidence that the arresting officer was aware of the 
citizen’s affirmative defense. While this particular issue has arisen in only a 
few cases comparatively, the low volume may be a result of the present lack of 
clarity as to the role of an affirmative defense in the analysis. Upon 
implementation of the new rule, it may be discovered that a significant 
percentage of alleged false arrests involve facts giving rise to an affirmative 
defense. Thus, in addition to an increase in the success rate of such claims, 
there may be an influx in lawsuits filed. Any increase in the volume of claims, 
however, will hopefully be short-lived. 
One would hope that as each jurisdiction adopts the proposed rule and 
applies it to pending cases, law enforcement agencies would take appropriate 
steps to train police officers as to the relevance of an affirmative defense in 
probable cause analysis. It’s perhaps naïve and overly optimistic to believe that 
agencies will be proactive in this step. A few large verdicts or settlements may 
be necessary to spur such action. Section 1983 monetary awards are intended 
to be both compensatory and punitive. While the statute aims to provide 
monetary compensation to the victims of false arrest, the primary effect 
sought is the prevention and deterrence of future similar conduct. 
Historically, only significant payouts beget significant change. Considering 
the right to roam free is arguably the most fundamental of all rights, any 
increase in the success rate or volume of false arrest claims as a result of the 
rule proposed would be unquestionably justified. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The specific query posed by the court in Thomas was “[a]re there any 
circumstances in which facts relating to affirmative defenses, such as defense 
of property, [are] relevant to the probable cause inquiry?”206 While 
acknowledging there is no duty to investigate an alleged affirmative defense, 
the court found “under certain circumstances, a police officer’s awareness of 
 
 205. Notably, an increase in cases proceeding to trial would result in broader and more 
robust precedent and thus more clarity for courts and law enforcement. 
 206. Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief on Issues Discussed During the Hearing on Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss Held June 10, 2011 at 2, Thomas v. City of Galveston, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826 
(S.D. Tex. 2011) (No. H-10-3331), 2011 WL 13273799. 
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the facts supporting a defense can eliminate probable cause.”207 As 
exemplified in Thomas, one such circumstance arises upon allegations the  
§ 1983 plaintiff was acting in defense of the officer’s own unlawful conduct.208 
A review of cases nationally reveals other prospective factual 
circumstances where a suspect’s affirmative defense may be germane to the 
analysis. Though most are theoretical, a few courts have found facts of the 
affirmative defense sufficient to defeat the comparatively low requirements 
for establishing probable cause. Notably, courts have been remarkably 
inconsistent on this issue: Some claim the affirmative defense is never 
relevant, then discuss the relevance anyway; a plurality have found there are 
circumstances where the defense could bear on probable cause, at least 
arguably, but on the facts at hand concluded the defense had no effect on 
reasonableness; and, a minority of courts have found the affirmative defense 
was not only relevant, but sufficient to negate probable cause. Courts consider 
a myriad of factors in determining whether evidence of an affirmative defense 
concerns probable cause, and the weight given to each varies not only among 
jurisdictions, but even among courts within a jurisdiction. The multitude of 
factors and inconsistent application, coupled with the inherent complexities 
of probable cause analysis, highlight the need for a simple, uniform rule. 
The rule expressed in Thomas, while it represents a bold move in the right 
direction, stops short of ensuring Fourth Amendment reasonableness. The 
“conclusive knowledge” requirement places the bar too high, incorporates 
unnecessary complexity, and, as the examples shared in this Article reveal, 
creates the potential to result in constitutional harm without a remedy. 
Instead, absent exigent circumstances, all facts available to the arresting 
officer should be on equal footing when the reasonableness of the arrest is 
evaluated objectively. As explained herein, application of the True Totality 
Rule would not require a significant departure from the way most courts are 
analyzing probable cause. Of the courts that have deemed evidence of an 
affirmative defense irrelevant, most ultimately go on to analyze the sufficiency 
of such evidence anyway, performing an analysis which is nearly 
indistinguishable to the reasonableness assessment proposed by the True 
Totality Rule. 
Courts finding the available affirmative defense irrelevant often opine 
that the viability of an affirmative defense is better suited for review by judges 
and juries than by an officer on the scene of the arrest. The general view of 
 
 207. Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 836 (quoting Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 135 (2d 
Cir. 2003)). 
 208. Although Thomas’ complaint is void of specific allegations that the affirmative defense 
negated probable cause, the court inferred from the complaint an allegation the officers knew 
they were attempting to steal his generator and thus knew Thomas was acting in defense of such 
unlawful conduct. Id. at 837 (“Plaintiff’s actions were allegedly provoked entirely by the conduct 
of the officers, so the officers would have known that Plaintiff only made a threat of force in 
defense of his property and had those [sic] done nothing wrong.”). 
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these courts is to permit the officer to make the arrest despite the affirmative 
defense, and then let the justice system iron it out. This is a sensible approach 
in scenarios where an officer reasonably believes the suspect is likely to escape 
or commit additional crimes, or when the scene is one of chaos. But when 
these circumstances are not present, and an officer has a reasonable 
opportunity to evaluate the situation in order to make a determination of 
whether to take away the citizen’s right to be free, exculpatory facts, such as 
those supporting an affirmative defense, should be weighed before affecting 
the arrest. While the charges may ultimately be dropped, or the citizen may 
eventually be acquitted of the crime charged as a result of the affirmative 
defense,209 these post-arrest actions will not undo the embarrassment and 
expense, and all the ripple effects, of having been arrested in the first place. 
The arrest alone can be devastating to a citizen, particularly one with limited 
resources. Whereas a citizen with means to afford bail may be released in a 
few hours, a citizen without such resources may spend months or even years 
waiting for the evidence of their affirmative defense to be evaluated.210 Even 
a short stay in jail while the justice system “irons it out” could result in the 
citizen losing her job and health care benefits, being unable to pay her bills, 
being evicted, losing her vehicle by repossession, having her children 
removed from her custody and placed in foster care, suffering irreparable 
harm to her credit, reputation and status in the community, and the list goes 
on. While it may seem reasonable to remove from the officer the burden of 
performing the analysis on the scene of an arrest, this burden is justified by 
the need to get it right; it is absurd to allow an officer to ignore or evaluate 
differently exculpatory evidence on the notion that the matter will eventually 
be worked out in the justice system, a system that is both slow and imperfect, 
and historically prejudicial to those of color and of limited means. This is not 
to say that the mere existence of evidence of an affirmative defense will 
necessarily negate probable cause for the arrest; in fact, under most 
circumstances the officer will have probable cause for the arrest despite some 
evidence of an available affirmative defense. However, when an officer has an 
 
 209. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN 
COUNTIES, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 24 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/fdluc09.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4VJ-8JY3]. The data in Table 21 reveals that approximately 
1 out of every 3 defendants in the nation’s largest counties were not convicted of any crime. Id. 
at 24 tbl.21.  
 210. See ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRE-TRIAL/REMAND 
IMPRISONMENT LIST 3 (2d ed. 2012), available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/ 
files/resources/downloads/world_pre-trial_imprisonment_list_2nd_edition_1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/R3BX-BWXR] (revealing that, in 2012, approximately 480,000 men and women were 
held in U.S. jails awaiting trial); see also REAVES, supra note 209, at 22–23 (finding that defendants 
detained before trial waited a median of 68 days in jail, but in some areas, defendants were found 
to have waited over two years for their trial). The study also found that 34 percent of those held 
in jail awaiting trial were detained solely because they could not make bail. REAVES, supra note 
209, at 17 tbl.12.  
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objectively reasonable basis to believe, as a result of an affirmative defense, it 
is not probable that the suspect has committed a crime, the officer should 
refrain from exercising his extreme and potentially devastating power of 
arrest. 
Application of the True Totality Rule may, on occasion, result in an 
officer choosing to not arrest a citizen who is actually guilty of the crime. Such 
a consequence, however, would align with the maxim that it is better to let 
100 guilty men go free than for one innocent to suffer.211 Notably, a decision 
to not arrest the suspect at the scene does not necessarily result in a guilty 
man going free or unpunished. Choosing to not arrest does not foreclose an 
opportunity for law enforcement to investigate further and later bring 
charges. Conversely, choosing to arrest despite available evidence that no 
crime was committed may forever impact the innocent citizen’s life and her 
view on justice and the justice system. Of course, in adopting the rule 
proposed by this Article, courts must synchronously conclude, as the Thomas 
court did, that the rule is already clearly established by the fact that it is 
encompassed within the prevailing notions that the right to be free from 
arrest without probable cause is a clearly established constitutional right, and 
that it is clearly established that probable cause requires a review of all the 
facts and circumstances available to the officer. Without this 
contemporaneous finding, or, alternatively, Congressional action, 
constitutional violations will continue without a remedy, and a constitutional 
right without a remedy is no right at all. 
 
 
 211. See Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan (Mar. 14, 1785), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 293 (Albert H. Smyth ed., 1907) (“That it is better 100 guilty 
Persons should escape than that one innocent Person should suffer, is a Maxim that has been 
long and generally approved.”); see also VOLTAIRE, ZADIG 53 (Project Gutenberg 2006) (1749) 
(ebook) (“[T]hat generous Maxim; that ‘tis much more Prudence to acquit two Persons, tho’ actually 
guilty, than to pass Sentence of Condemnation in one that is virtuous and innocent.”); WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358 (9th ed. 1978) (1783) (“[F]or the 
law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”). 
